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THE RISE AND FALL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
IN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
STEVEN D. SMiTH-
The thesis of this Article can be succinctly stated: our constitu-
tional commitment to religious freedom contains a fatal internal
flaw-a propensity toward self-cancellation. This internal flaw has
manifested itself in our recent constitutional history. The intelli-
gent constitutional commitment to religious freedom that once
existed in this country has deteriorated,1 and this deterioration is
due, in significant measure, not to a decline in religiosity in either
the general or the legal culture, but rather to the self-negating
quality of the commitment itself.
This self-negating propensity stems from the paradoxical
relationship between religious freedom's historical justification and
its current interpretation. The principal historical justification for
our constitutional commitment to religious freedom was a religious
rationale. 2 The justification relied upon religious premises and
worked within a religious world view.3 Moreover, quite apart from
its historical significance, the religious justification is also the most
satisfying, and perhaps the only adequate justification for a special
constitutional commitment to religious liberty. Today, however,
religious freedom, at least as it has come to be understood, forbids
governmental reliance upon religious justifications as a basis for
public policies or decisions. 4 Therein lies the paradox-our
constitutional commitment to religious freedom undermines its own
foundation; it cancels itself out by precluding government from
recognizing and acting upon the principal justification supporting
that commitment.
If correct, the thesis that religious liberty is self-negating will
explain a good deal. It is by now notorious that legal doctrines and
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judicial decisions in the area of religious freedom are in serious
disarray. In perhaps no other area of constitutional law have
confusion and inconsistency achieved such undisputed sovereignty.
5
This Article suggests that the internal, self-negating quality of our
commitment to religious freedom renders us incapable of interpret-
ing and applying that commitment in a coherent fashion.
In addition to doctrinal confusion, the law in this area has lately
exhibited a marked insensitivity to the value of what it is ostensibly
designed to protect-the freedom of citizens to believe and practice
their religion. This insensitivity is especially evident in recent
decisions under the Free Exercise Clause, but it is manifest in other
areas as well. 6 It would be easy to blame this relaxation of protec-
tion on a growing secularism that marginalizes religious belief and
practice. But that easy explanation is inconsistent with survey and
sociological evidence indicating that religious belief has not
declined in this country.7 I will argue that the waning of our
constitutional commitment to religious liberty need not be ex-
plained by any deterioration in religious commitment. Rather, the
phenomenon results from the self-canceling character of the
commitment itself.
Thus, the thesis of this Article has considerable explanatory
value-if, that is, the thesis is not implausible. But that is an
important reservation. Legal disputes raising issues of religious
freedom are as numerous today as ever, and they often elicitjudicial
pronouncements paying respect to the importance of religious
freedom in our constitutional scheme. These pronouncements may
seem to contradict the contention that our commitment to religious
freedom has dwindled.
I can offer no quick answer to this objection, but its force can
perhaps be blunted by a preliminary clarification of what I will
argue. My contention that there is at present no intelligent
constitutional commitment to religious freedom should not be
5 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or
Rejected?, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 513, 543 (1990) ("It is hard to
think of a contemporary legal doctrine that is as besieged from all quarters as
[current Establishment Clause doctrine]."); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A
Needed Clarification ofthe Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233,233 (1989) (observing
that "few areas of constitutional law lie in greater confusion"). For further discussion
of the prevailing incoherence, see infra part V.A.
6 For a gloomy assessment of recent developments, see Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1 and infra part V.B.
7 See infra part II.B.
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understood to assert more than it actually claims. For example, in
denying that there is an "intelligent" constitutional commitment to
religious freedom, I acknowledge that there may be a commitment
that is merely traditional or instinctual,8 but that is not based on
consciously understood and currently believable grounds. In
addition, a constitutional commitment to religious freedom is not the
same as actual religious freedom; either might exist without the
other.9 Hence, in arguing that there is no intelligent constitutional
commitment to religious freedom I do not deny that a considerable
measure of actual religious freedom continues to exist in this
country.
Furthermore, I am speaking about a specific constitutional
commitment to religious freedom. It is possible that there is a
commitment to other kinds of freedom-general personal autonomy,
perhaps, or freedom of belief-and that religious conduct or belief
may sometimes fall within these other categories.10 One might
hold, for example, that a person is free to be a pantheist simply
because pantheism is a belief and citizens have a constitutional right
to believe whatever they choose. The fact that pantheism is a
religious belief would be irrelevant to this claim. I do not deny the
existence of constitutional commitments to various kinds of
freedoms that may sometimes happen to protect religious beliefs or
practices. I contend only that there was once an intelligent
constitutional commitment to religious freedom specifically, and that
this commitment has seriously deteriorated.
That deterioration is due in part, I will argue, to the conceptual
paradox that has caused our constitutional commitment to religious
freedom to cancel itself out. This contention also warrants
preliminary clarification. First, I will focus on one intellectual
strand in a complex historical and cultural tapestry. The strand I
8 This statement is not meant to disparage an instinctual commitment to religious
freedom. An instinctual commitment may be better than none at all. One might
even argue that a purely instinctual commitment is more secure than a conscious and
rational one, although the analysis presented in this Article, particularlyin part IV.H.,
questions that proposition.
9 For example, a legal community might have a commitment to religious freedom
yet lack the will or the resources to carry out that commitment. Conversely, a legal
community might have no commitment to religious freedom, but for other reasons
(perhaps because the community is generally indifferent to religion or adheres to a
policy of general laissez faire) religious freedom might nonetheless flourish.
10 See generally William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise
as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983) (arguing for protection of free exercise
rights through the Free Speech Clause).
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have chosen to examine is a central one, but I do not mean to imply
that it represents the whole picture. Second, even with respect to
the intellectual strand I am considering, I do not mean to suggest
there is anything compulsory or logically inescapable about the
conceptual paradox. We-the constitutional community, including
especially the Supreme Court and those who criticize or prescribe
to it-might have avoided the paradox by thinking more carefully
about the meaning of religious freedom. Specifically, we might have
avoided the paradox by declining to adopt an interpretation holding
that governmental reliance upon religiousjustifications is incompati-
ble with a commitment to religious freedom. It is even possible that
we still can dissolve the paradox and escape the malaise that
currently afflicts constitutional musings on the matter of religious
freedom (although at the moment I see little reason for optimism
on this score). The paradox, in short, describes the course our
thinking about religious freedom has taken, not a course that our
thinking was or is compelled to take.
Part I discusses the religious justification and argues for the
central importance of thatjustification in generating a commitment
to religious freedom in the founding period. Part II describes the
disappearance of the religious justification from contemporary
constitutional discourse. It also considers and rejects the view that
would explain this disappearance by an assumption that seculariza-
tion has deprived the religious justification's premises of their
plausibility. Part III offers a better explanation: the religious
justification has been rendered inadmissible in public discussion by
the prevailing interpretation of what religious freedom means. In
this way, our commitment to religious freedom has nullified its own
historical justification.
Part IV considers possible nonreligious replacements for the
religious justification. It concludes that the most common nonreli-
gious rationales for religious freedom are vulnerable to serious
objections and, thus, are probably inadequate to sustain a strong
constitutional commitment. Part V examines the consequences of
this failure of justification, arguing that it has produced massive
incoherence in religion clause jurisprudence and a withdrawal of
judicial protection for religious freedom.
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I. THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Thomas Jefferson's description of "the constitutional freedom
of religion" as "the most inalienable and sacred of all human
rights"11 reflects, more or less accurately, an understanding that
has prevailed during much of our history.12 That understanding
generates a serious problem: what is the justification for affording
special constitutional protection to religious freedom? Our
constitutional scheme, of course, is vitally concerned with human
freedom generally.'" However, most aspects of that freedom
receive only generic protection through provisions designed to
ensure, for example, democratic government and due process of
law. Yet a few freedoms have historically been singled out and
elevated to special constitutional status. Religious freedom has been
one of these. 14  The question is, why? How did religion, as
opposed to other candidates for special protection, such as
economic interests, come to achieve distinct recognition as a
centerpiece in our constitutional system?
15
" Thomas Jefferson, Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia, in THE
COMPLETE JEFFERSON 957, 958 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1969).
12 Mary Ann Glendon asserts that Americans generally rank religious freedom as
the most important of our constitutional rights, ahead of freedom ofspeech, but that
the legal academy and the "knowledge class" do not give it the same priority. See
Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Provisions of the
Constitution, Address to the Bicentennial Conference on the Religion Clauses (May
30, 1991) (transcript on file with author).
13 The Preamble to the Constitution states that one of its major purposes is to
"secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." U.S. CONST. pmbl.
14 See ARUN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUs LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 91
(1990) ("[T]he Founders granted religion a special status in the Constitution. This
status derived from a conviction that religious exercise, as opposed to other personal
and social forces, needed and deserved unique treatment."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-7, at 1189 (2d ed. 1988) ("The Framers ...
dearly envisioned religion as something special; they enacted that vision into law by
guaranteeing the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science."); cf.
Paul J. Weber, Concluding Reflections, in EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE
RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 149, 150 (Paul J. Weber ed., 1990)
[hereinafter EQUAL SEPARATION] (suggesting that "the freedom to exercise one's
religion is an independent, substantive right under the Constitution and... this
religious liberty can justly be called 'the first freedom'").
15 For a discussion of the special place of religion as opposed to economic
interests in the constitutional scheme, see Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of
Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 83-84.
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A. The Religious Justification
As a historical matter, the answer to that question has often
taken the form of a religious justification.1 6 In current discourse,
however, this explanation is less familiar, and may even seem
counterintuitive. Consequently, it will be useful to spell out the
religious justification before considering its role in our constitution-
al history.
The religious justification has been stated in various ways and
with varying degrees of elaboration. The essential argument can be
presented in the form of two claims: the priority claim and the
voluntariness claim. The priority claim asserts that "religious
goods"-that is, the distinctive goods, benefits, or blessings toward
which religious beliefs and practices are directed-are more valuable
or more important than most or perhaps all other human goods.
The idea is expressed in The Bible: "For what is a man profited if he
gains the whole world, and loses his own soul?"17 The priority
claim can also be made in more deontological terms: religious
duties take precedence over other duties, including nonreligious
legal or social duties.
The voluntariness claim asserts that religious goods or duties by
their nature entail freedom of choice.1 8 It is futile, at least from
a religious perspective, to force a person to profess a religious creed
or conform to a religious practice because compulsory faith lacks
religious efficacy. Compelled religion, the voluntariness claim
16 Although I use the singular here to refer to the religious justification that is the
subject of this Article, there are other argumentsjustifying religious freedom that are
religious in nature. For example, Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance contains
several arguments that are religious in character. SeeJames Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT ON
CHURCH AND STATE 18, 18-23 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988); infra notes 46-48.17 Matthew 16:26.
18 Freedom, in this context, means freedom from external governmental coercion.
Religious believers have historically disagreed about whether the will is free and
whether humans can contribute through their own choices to their salvation. See
David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 769, 852-74 (1991). These theological disagreements have not
prevented believers of various sorts from agreeing on the inefficacy, or even the
impossibility, of religious belief and practice compelled by government.
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insists, is a contradiction in terms;19 in Roger Williams's pungent
expression, "'forced worship stinks in God's nostrils."'
20
Taken together, but only when taken together, these claims can
support a constitutional commitment to religious freedom. If
religious goods or duties take precedence over other goods or
duties, as the priority claim asserts, then the state should not
interfere with religion in the interest of other matters that are
necessarily less weighty. Taken by itself, however, the priority claim
calls upon government to respect religion, but not necessarily
religious freedom. On the contrary, if religion is the source of
supremely important goods or duties, then it might seem that a
government concerned for the welfare of its citizens should require
them to accept such goods or to perform such duties.21 After all,
governments commonly oblige citizens with compulsory education
laws, mandatory social security withholding, seat belt requirements,
and substance abuse prohibitions, at least in part on the ground that
such compulsion is good even for those citizens who fail to
appreciate the wisdom in these measures. Why should government
impose these mundane benefits on its citizens and at the same time
neglect their incomparably greater interest in the salvation of their
souls? It is the voluntariness claim with its insistence upon the
futility of compulsory religion that justifies a public commitment
not just to religion, but to religious freedom.
Just as the religious justification for religious freedom cannot
rest on the priority claim alone, however, neither can it rely solely
on the voluntariness claim. To be sure, compulsory religion may be
futile and even self-contradictory. This realization should discour-
age government from interfering with citizens' religious beliefs and
practices in order to secure religious benefits for these citizens.
22
19 This argument was a central theme in John Locke's A Letter Concerning
Toleration, which strongly influenced the thinking of many Americans, including
Jefferson and Madison. See Lance BanningJames Madison, the Statute for Religious
Freedom, and the Crisis of Republican Convictions, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EvOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 109,
118 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988) [hereinafter VIRGINIA
STATUTE].
20 PATRICIA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND
PoLmCs IN COLONIAL AMERICA 35 (1986) (quoting Roger Williams).
21 Augustine argued to this effect. See Letter CLXXIII from Augustine to Donatus
(A.D. 416), in CHRISTIAN SOCIAL TEACHINGS 79-83 (George W. Forell ed., 1966).
22 Government might, however, compel outward adherence to religion not in
order to benefit the persons so compelled, but rather to protect the faith of weak
believers who might be disturbed or shaken by the deviations of others. Aquinas
justified religious coercion in this way. SeeJOHN T. NOONAN,JR., THE BELIEVER AND
1991]
156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:149
But the discussion need not end there. For one thing, government
may have nonreligious reasons for regulating practices that happen
to be religious. Government may prohibit the use of peyote, for
example, not because of any religious objection to the ceremonies
in which peyote is essential, but rather because peyote happens to
be on a list physically harmful drugs.23 If government has nonreli-
gious reasons for regulating religious practices, the voluntariness
claim gives no reason for restraint. Only the priority claim provides
such a reason.
In sum, the priority and voluntariness claims together form a
cogent justification for extending special legal protection to
religious freedom. The priority claim suggests that government
should respect religion and avoid subordinating religious goods and
duties in favor of secular concerns. The voluntariness claim
suggests that the way in which government should respect religion
is by securing religious freedom.
Of course, this justification will be effective only if government
finds the priority and voluntariness claims persuasive. But that
observation raises difficult questions: Are these claims persuasive?
Are they even the kind of claims that government is competent to
accept or reject?
B. The Centrality of the Religious Justification
in the Founding Period
It seems obvious today that the religious justification for
religious freedom is at least controversial. An agnostic, for
example, is not likely to agree that distinctively spiritual or religious
goods and duties are supremely important; he may regard such
ostensible goods and duties as illusory or even contemptible.
24
For present purposes, however, the critical point is that although
the religious justification is not universally persuasive, thatjustifica-
tion carried considerable weight with Americans of the founding
generation.
25
THE POWERS THAT ARE 36-41 (1987) (reprinting and discussing pertinent portions of
Summa Theologica).
23 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
This decision is discussed infra part V.B.
24 SeeJAMES TURNER, WrHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORiGINs OF UNBELIEF
IN AMERICA 203-25 (1985) (explaining the nineteenth-century agnostics' view that
religious belief was immoral).25 Cf PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTrrUTION 22-23 (1964) (explaining
the classical Christian belief, which motivated American dedication to religious
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Its influence is hardly surprising given the pervasively religious
world view then prevailing. Although historians disagree about
whether the establishment of the Republic, and in particular the
adoption of constitutional protections for religious freedom, should
be viewed primarily as the products of religious or secular think-
ing,2 6 one can safely make two generalizations about Americans of
the founding period. First, the founding generation was deeply and
pervasively influenced by Protestant thought and practice.27 The
religious justification for religious freedom has deep roots in
Protestant thought, with its emphasis upon the distinction between
the "two kingdoms."28 Second, even those Americans like Jeffer-
son, who departed from Protestant orthodoxy under the influence
of the Enlightenment and who were accordingly sometimes
regarded by their more pious contemporaries as "infidels" or even
freedom in the founding period, that "faith is not to be achieved by coercive power
but by the working of the spirit of God").
26 Bernard Bailyn's classic account of the American founding stresses its secular
qualities and gives little emphasis to religious elements and influences. See BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). For a
more recent essay arguing that the Founders were in essence "secular humanists," see
John M. Murrin, Religion and Politics in America from the First Settlements to the Civil
War, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITIcS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE
1980s, at 19, 30-33 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990) [hereinafter RELIGION AND AMERICAN
POLITICS]. For studies underscoring the religious character of the founding, see ELLIS
SANDoz, A GOVERNMENT OF LAWs: POLrriAL THEORY, RELIGION, AND THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING (1990); Ruth H. Bloch, Religion and Ideological Change in the
American Revolution, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra, at 44. For a
historical study that attempts to split the difference, see William L. Miller, The Moral
Project of the American Founders, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 17 (James D.
Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990) [hereinafter ARTICLES OF FAITH].27 See e.g., THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986) (noting that in the
founding period, "Protestant Christianity thoroughly permeated civil and political
life").
28 The "two kingdoms" are church and civil government:
Luther and Calvin both argued that God had instituted two kingdoms on
earth, one spiritual to be administered by the church, and the other
temporal to be ruled by a civil sovereign. This dualism was incorporated
into the theologies of certain Protestant sects of the late Reformation ....
In the view of [these sects], unity or alignment of the church with civil
government unavoidably corrupted the church and stained the religious
conscience of its believers. The only solution that would preserve the
religious integrity of the church and its believers was separation of their
religious activities of devotion and worship from the political activities of
government.
Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REv.
113, 117-18 (1991).
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"atheists,"29 viewed the world in strongly religious terms.30  In
sum, "in eighteenth-century America-in city, village, and country-
side-the idiom of religion penetrated all discourse, underlay all
thought, marked all observances, gave meaning to every public and
private crisis."
3 1
In view of this broadly religious framework, it is not surprising
that the religious justification for religious freedom had great force
in the colonial and founding periods. The argument was eloquently
advanced by ministers and religious leaders such as Roger Williams,
William Penn, John Leland, and Isaac Backus.3 2 Although conced-
ing this much, however, one common position holds that more
"enlightened" and politically powerful advocates of religious
freedom such as Madison and Jefferson acted upon a secular
rationale.
33
29 James Turner observes that "[w]hat the orthodox called 'atheism' usually
amounted to nothing but a Deistic denial of revealed religion.... If one disregards
the expatriate Barlowjust before 1800, America does not seem to have harbored a
single individual before the nineteenth century who disbelieved in God." TURNER,
supra note 24, at 44.
So For a useful discussion of the essentially Christian foundations ofJeffersonian
thought, see DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 27-56,
151-66, 243-48 (1948).
S1 BONOMI, supra note 20, at 3. Moreover, contrary to the view that religiosity
declined in the colonies as the early Puritan approach to life lost its initial vigor,
Bonomi sees an "increasing interpenetration of religion and politics" as the
eighteenth century progressed. Id. at 8-9. Another writer adds:
[W]e may be able to understand [eighteenth-century American] political
thought better if we start where they nearly always did, with religion. Men
of the late eighteenth century, whether they were Calvinists or Arminians,
deists or atheists, seldom thought about any branch of human affairs
without referring consciously to some general beliefs about the nature of
the universe and man's place in it, and about human nature itself. In this
sense Jefferson and Paine were as religious as any New England Congrega-
tionalist. The denials and defiances of Enlightenment skeptics and
materialists are denials and defiances of religious doctrine, usually religious
in their own intent.
HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA at xiii-xiv (1976).
32 For useful overviews, see ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 14, at 21-31, and
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437-43, 1445-46 (1990). For a discussion of Isaac
Backus's views and his influence in the achievement of religious freedom, see
Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 870-74.
33 See, e.g., Edwin S. Gaustad, ColonialReligion and Liberty of Conscience, in VIRGINIA
STATUTE, supra note 19, at 23; Murrin, supra note 26, at 33; John Witte, Jr., The
Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Religion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40
EMORY L.J. 489, 491-97 (1991).
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This view may reflect the interpretation offered in Mark
DeWolfe Howe's classic The Garden and the Wilderness.34  Howe
discussed two competing and historically prominent rationales for
religious freedom. One rationale, which Howe associated with
Roger Williams, was concerned with protecting the church against
the corruptions of politics; Howe called this the "theological" or
"evangelical" rationale for church-state separation.3 5 But Howe
assumed that "enlightened" statesmen, such as Madison and
Jefferson, were primarily seeking to protect politics from intrusions
by the church. These statesmen favored religious freedom on the
basis of a "political" rationale. 36 To be sure, a major purpose of
Howe's study was to restore the theological justification to its
proper place. Thus, he argued that the theological rationale for
religious freedom was as influential during the founding period as
the political rationale,37 and that by refusing to acknowledge that
theological theme the modern Supreme Court had produced bad
history and bad legal analysis.3 8 Nonetheless, Howe's attribution
of a "political" rationale to the more politically influential propo-
nents of religious freedom may seem to support an interpretation
that sees the religious justification as secondary in the achievement
of a constitutional commitment to religious freedom.
Howe's interpretation is apt to mislead, however, if it is
understood as depicting our constitutional religious freedom to be
the result of two competing rationales, one religious and one
secular.3 9 This understanding reflects a problem described by
34 MARK D. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOvERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL HIsTORY (1965). Though perhaps not
all critics would be quite so generous, the status of Howe's work is reflected in the
judgment of one constitutional scholar, expressed more than twenty years after the
book was published: "[Howe's study] remains by far the best piece of scholarship in
the field of church and state." Tom Gerety, Legal Gardening: Mark DeWolfe Howe on
Church and State: A Retrospective Essay, 38 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596 (1986).
35 See HowE, supra note 34, at 6-10.
56 See id. at 1-2, 6-7.
37 Howe's overall interpretation stressed that "men of the eighteenth century who
demanded a constitutional proscription of laws relating to religion did so because of
the deep conviction that the realm of spirit lay beyond the reach of government." Id.
at 17-18.
38 See id. at 4-19. Howe contended that "[b]y superficial and purposive
interpretations of the past, the Court has dishonored the arts of the historian and
degraded the talents of the lawyer." Id. at 4.
s It is not clear that Howe meant his thesis to be understood in this way. His
purpose was not to challenge the modern understanding, which views the Jeffersonian
rationale as "secular." Even so, he noted that the secular quality of Jefferson's
thinking had "possibly [been] exaggerated." Id. at 2.
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Howe himself as "the unnoted change in the meaning of familiar
words and the consequent transformation of controlling con-
cepts." 40 Ruth Bloch has observed that "[a] connection between
what we normally distinguish as religious or secular was embedded
in the very meaning of Revolutionary language itself."41 Thus, the
contrast between the Williams and the Jeffersonian positions is
more accurately described as a difference in kinds or styles of
religious thinking, not as a conflict between "religious" and
"secular" thought in the contemporary sense of those terms. The
"religious" style was specifically biblical and evangelical in character;
the "secular" style, grounded in "natural religion," was more generic
and philosophical in its religious orientation. But both rationales
were centrally dependent upon religious, indeed theistic, assump-
tions.
This religious quality is discernible in the post-Revolution
controversy in Virginia that provoked Madison's famous Memorial
and Remonstrance and produced both the defeat of the Assessments
Bill for subsidizing Christian ministers and the adoption of
Jefferson's Virginia Act for Religious Freedom.4 2 Arguments for
freedom of religion were expressed in countless citizen petitions-
the assessments controversy generated thousands. Rhys Isaac
groups these petitions into two categories. One kind, reflecting the
thinking and rhetoric of the Separatist Baptists, argued that the
Holy Ghost was sufficient to maintain and direct the church without
governmental assistance and that state-supported religion was
contrary to "the spirit of the Gospel."4 3 The other type, exhibiting
a Presbyterian viewpoint, "confin[ed] themselves largely to rational,
secular arguments and to the language of natural religion, rather
than employing a rhetoric that invoked Scriptural revelation and the
powers of divine grace."
44
Isaac's description of these arguments as "rational" and "secular"
must be understood in the historical context which he is discussing.
40 Id. at 154.
41 Bloch, supra note 26, at 51; see also Harry S. Stout, Rhetoric and Reality in The
Early Republic: The Case of the Federalist Clergy, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLrTICS,
supra note 26, at 62, 65 ("Differences that would radically divide 'secular humanists'
and 'evangelicals' . . . were, in 1787, still more potential than real.").
42 On the historical significance of the Virginia Act, see infra text accompanying
note 183.
Rhys Isaac, "The Rage of Malice of the Old Serpent Devil": The Dissenters and the
Making and Remaking of the Virginia Statutefor Religious Freedom, in VIRGINIA STATUTE,
supra note 19, at 139, 150-51.
44 Id. at 150.
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By contrast to the Baptist petitions, which were filled with biblical
language and appeals to the Christian creed, the Presbyterian
petitions may indeed have seemed "secular." To modern eyes,
however, these arguments look distinctly religious. Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance, which Isaac views as an expression of the
"Presbyterian" or "secular" position, 45 clearly articulated the
religious justification for religious freedom. Madison's primary
argument asserted:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage,
and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty
is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the
claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member
of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the
Universe: And f a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordi-
nate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the
general authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of
any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the
Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of
Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
4 6
In this argument, Madison used the language of social contract
and obligation to assert the priority of religious duties over other
duties. If our obligation to the Creator precedes our assumption of
the obligations imposed by civil society, then the latter obligations
are subject or subordinate to our religious duties. In the first
sentence of the preceding quotation Madison also expressly asserted
that religion is essentially voluntary in nature.47 Thus, Madison
forcefully advanced both the priority and voluntariness claims as
part of a religious justification for religious freedom.
48
45 See id. at 149-50.
46 Madison, supra note 16, at 18-19 (emphasis added).
47 The voluntariness claim is also explicit in Madison's assertion that "we hold it
for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion or the duty which we owe to
our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence.'" Id. at 18.
48 The religious justification occupied first position in the Memorial and
Remonstrance and was the principal argument for the claim that freedom of religion
is an "unalienable" right. However, Madison also advanced a variety of other
arguments. Some of these assumed or built upon the religiousjustification. Several
others, which did not necessarily rest upon that assumption, were nonetheless
religious in character. For example, Madison argued that the use of religion "as an
engine of Civil policy" amounted to "an unhallowed perversion of the means of
salvation." Id. at 20. He also contended that state support is bad for the church,
producing "pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in
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The religious justification offered by Madison echoed similar
arguments that Jefferson had advanced in the Virginia legisla-
ture.49  A religious argument was likewise put forward-albeit
without comparable elaboration-in Jefferson's Virginia Act for
Religious Freedom. The Act's preamble began with the declaration
that "Almighty God hath created the mind free," and it proceeded
to assert that any form of compelled religion represents "a depar-
ture from the plan of the Holy Author of our religion."5 0 Thus,
the religious justification for religious freedom occupied a central
place in the arguments not only of ministers and religious leaders,
but also of political leaders such as Madison and Jefferson.
51
In emphasizing the importance of the religious justification, I do
not suggest that the achievement of religious freedom in the United
States was a simple affair in which the Founders reflected upon the
priority and the essentially voluntary character of religion, discov-
ered that Christian beliefs required religious freedom, and then
promptly acted upon this discovery by adopting the First Amend-
ment and similar provisions at the state level. History is never that
neat. In the first place, religious arguments obviously did not all
run in one direction; opponents of religious freedom could offer
religious arguments for their position. 52 In addition, proponents
of religious freedom naturally did not place their entire reliance
both, superstition, bigotry, and persecution." Id. at 21. Further, Madison argued that
the effect of an established church would be to discourage immigration by persons
not belonging to that church, and that this would be unfortunate because "[tihe first
wish of those who enjoy this precious gift [of Christianity], ought to be that it maybe
imparted to the whole race of mankind." Id. at 23.49 See Thomas E. Buckley, The Political Theology of Thomas Jefferson, in VIRGINIA
STATUTE, supra note 19, at 75, 85-86.
50 Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 1986),
reprinted in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 19, at xvii. For a helpful discussion of the
religious premises and values underlying both the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom
and otherJeffersonian legislation, see Daniel L. Dreisbach, ThomasJefferson and Bills
Number 82-86 of the Revision of the Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786. New Light on the
Jeffersonian Model of Church-State Relations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 159 (1990).
51 See Buckley, supra note 49, at 77 (asserting thatJefferson "argued for separation
of church and state based on the nature of religion itself, and founded a public policy
for the United States on a theology"); see also David Little, Religion and Civil Virtue in
America: Jefferson's Statute Reconsidered, in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 19, at 237,
249-51 (discussing important similarities between Madison's and Jefferson's
arguments for religious freedom and those of Roger Williams, and their common
basis in Christian tradition).
52 See, e.g.,John T. Noonan,Jr., 'Quota of Imps," in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note
19, at 171, 182-83 (describing arguments of Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons of
Massachusetts favoring religious establishment in that state).
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upon a single argument. The religious justification discussed here
did occupy a central place in their thinking, but they offered other
arguments as well (many of which were also religious in charac-
ter).
5 3
Although the articulation during the founding period of diverse
arguments for religious freedom is entirely natural and in no way
inconsistent with the present argument, one alternative rationale
deserves special notice because in modern constitutional discourse
it is sometimes viewed as the historical justification for religious
freedom. According to this interpretation, the Framers opted for
religious freedom as a way of avoiding the civil turmoil that religion
might otherwise bring about, as had been shown by the religious
wars in Europe and by the civil wars that divided England in the
seventeenth century.54 Michael Smith relates that this civil peace
rationale is probably the most commonly articulated justification for
religious freedom in modern legal discourse. 55  If correct, this
interpretation might suggest that the religious justification was
merely peripheral or incidental in the achievement of religious
freedom.
Yet while the civil peace rationale probably influenced the
founding generation, the contention that it was the historical
rationale, or even the primary rationale, seems anachronistic; it
likely reflects what in the view of some modern interpreters should
have been the Framers' primary rationale, but not what Americans
of that period actually regarded as their principal ground for
religious freedom. For example, Jefferson recited a number of
rationales for religious freedom in the Virginia Act for Religious
Freedom, but did not mention the civil peace rationale in an explicit
form.5 6 And although he did advance the civil peace rationale for
religious freedom in his Notes on Virginia,57 other arguments
53 See supra note 48.
m See WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 9-10, 27-30 (1976); JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 56-60
(1960). For a recent student note arguing for this position, see Laura Zwicker, Note,
The Politics of Toleration: The Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined,
66 IND. LJ. 773 (1991).
55 See Smith, supra note 15, at 96; see also Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test
Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 674, 736-37 (1987).
56 See Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 1986),
reprinted in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 19, at xvii.
57 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 187 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
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asserting a religious justification,
58 a libertarian justification,
59
and a sort of governmental fallibilism-marketplace justification
60
received both priority of place and greater space in the discussion.
Likewise, Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance, asserted the
civil peace rationale, but that argument was hardly primary; it
appeared in the eleventh of fifteen paragraphs offering a variety of
justifications for religious freedom. 61 By contrast, the religious
justification was not only the first of Madison's arguments, but also
served as the predicate to a number of others.
The marginal role of the civil peace rationale may in part have
been the result of its essentially prudential character. Americans of
the founding generation were more attracted to arguments that
supported natural and inalienable rights, not mere pragmatic
policies.62 The religious justification could serve that purpose,6 3
but the more practical civil peace rationale could not.
Even more importantly, the civil peace rationale may not have
seemed very persuasive to Americans of the founding period.
Indeed, to many it may have seemed perversely wrongheaded. At
that time the common assumption was that civil peace and social
stability were enhanced by the maintenance of a uniform religion-
an arrangement that religious freedom threatened to upset:
For more than fourteen hundred years ... it was a universal
assumption that the stability of the social order and the safety of
the state demanded the religious solidarity of all the people in one
church. Every responsible thinker, every ecclesiastic, every ruler
Jefferson observed that the experiment with disestablishment in New York and
Pennsylvania had led to the flourishing of religion "sufficient to preserve peace and
order," and that in those states "harmony is unparalleled, and can be ascribed to
nothing but their unbounded tolerance." Id. at 276-77.
58 "The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit. We are
answerable for them to our God." Id. at 275.
59 "The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious
to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or
no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." Id.
60 See id. at 275-76.
61 See Madison, supra note 16, at 22.
62 See LEO PFEFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 101 (1953).
63 The value of the religious justification is suggested in Jefferson's observation:
"And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their
only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift
of God?" JEFFERSON, supra note 57, at 278. Cf. HaroldJ. Berman, Religious Freedom
and the Challenge of the Modem State, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, supra note 26, at 40, 53
(describing "Adams's and Madison's conception that religious freedom can only be
secure if it is undergirded by religious faith").
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and statesman who gave the matter any attention, held to this as
an axiom. There was no political or social philosophy which did
not build upon this assumption .... [A]ll, with no exceptions other
than certain disreputable and "subversive" heretics, believed firmly
that religious solidarity in the one recognized church was essential
to social and political stability.
64
This "universal assumption" was perhaps not universally held in
this country, but it was common. During the colonial period "it was
a 'self-evident' truth that church and state must labor side by side"
and "[t]he majority ... knew that society prospered, the state
advanced, and the gospel was made secure only as sacred and
secular realms coalesced." 65 The seventeenth-century experience
with religious toleration in Maryland supported this view.6 6 Mary-
landers eventually retreated from religious toleration and estab-
lished the Anglican church because "they had experienced directly
the bitter conflict that religious choice could foster."
67
Against this received wisdom, even "enlightened" statesmen such
as Madison andJefferson looked upon religious freedom as "a great
experiment. "68 Hence, it is not surprising that their arguments for
religious freedom did not emphasize the experimental and highly
controversial civil peace rationale, but instead stressed that religious
freedom was actually required by the very religious beliefs that most
Americans shared.
There is an important qualification of the thesis here presented.
The discussion has focused upon intellectual justifications for
64 SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIvELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN
AMERICA 60 (1963) (quoting Winfred E. Garrison, Characteristics ofAmerican Organized
Religion, 256 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, 16-17 (1948)).
5 Gaustad, supra note 33, at 23-24; see also BONOMI, supra note 20, at 14 ("Only
through ... [an established church], so the [colonial] leaders believed, might the
colonists ward off the evils of religious strife .... "). For a similar argument by Yale
president Timothy Dwight in the post-First Amendment period, see 4 TIMOTHY
DWIGIHr, Letter V: Vindication of the Establishment of the Public Worship of God by Law,
in TRAVELS IN NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK 283, 284-85 (Barbara M. Solomon ed.,
2d ed. 1969).
66 For an overview of the disarray that attended Maryland's experiment, see
BONOMI, supra note 20, at 21-24.
67 Murrin, supra note 26, at 21.
68 MEAD, supra note 64, at 59. James Madison later wrote that "the prevailing
opinion in Europe, England not excepted, has been that Religion could not be
preserved without the support of Government nor Government be supported without
an established religion." Letter from James Madison to Reverend Jasper Adams
(1832), in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77 (John F. Wilson ed., 1965).
Consequently, "[i]t remained for North America to bring the great & interesting
subject to a fair, and finally to a decisive test." Id.
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religious freedom; its attention has been on the realm of ideas. But
the clash of ideas always occurs in a social context. For example,
the founding generation's evolving commitment to disestablishment
was surely enhanced by the fact of religious pluralism-a condition
that may have effectively removed even the possibility of any
particular religion achieving exclusive official recognition on the
national level.69  Thus, as with any significant political develop-
ment, it will remain debatable whether the adoption of constitution-
al guarantees for religious freedom resulted more from intellectual
forces or from less rational political and social causes. For present
purposes, however, it is enough to observe that even if the social
fact of religious pluralism created the possibility of and the impetus
for religious freedom, the adoption of that position as a centerpiece
of the new constitutional order was not achieved, and likely could
not have been achieved, without the articulation of a principled
intellectual rationale. And in the late eighteenth century, the
religious justification provided that rationale.
70
69 SeeJohn F. Wilson, Religion, Governmen4 and Power in the New American Nation,
in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 26, at 77; see also Bradley, supra note
55, at 721-27 (discussing the impact of pluralism on the founding generation's
commitment to disestablishment). For a criticism of the view that the commitment
to religious freedom reflected merely a pragmatic response to a religiously pluralistic
society, see David Little, The Reformed Tradition and the Fist Amendment, in THE FIRST
FREEDOM: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 17 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1990).70 Although the religious justification is evident in the Virginia debates and in
arguments for religious liberty generally, that justification is not conspicuous in the
rather tepid congressional discussions of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
Its absence likely reflects the fact that those clauses were initially viewed primarily as
federalism measures; legislators did not regard themselves as resolving issues of
religious freedom on the merits, but rather as assigning the resolution of such issues
to the states. See Wilson, supra note 69, at 78-83. And of course some states were not
yet prepared to adopt a general commitment to religious freedom. See Noonan, supra
note 52, at 171 (describing post-First Amendment practices of Massachusetts
establishment). But cf. Winthrop S. Hudson, "Liberty, Both Civil and Religious, 'in THE
LIVELY EXPERIMENT CONTINUED 71, 81-84 (Jerald C. Brauer ed., 1987) (arguing that
citizens of Massachusetts were committed to religious liberty, and on religious
grounds, but did not perceive an inconsistency between religious liberty and
moderate establishment practices). The most one can say, therefore, is that the
religious justification gave central support to the commitment to religious freedom
where that commitment was in fact made-for example, in Virginia.
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II. THE MODERN TRANSFORMATION
"[T]he First Amendment did not settle the question of religion
and government in America," Jon Butler observes. "Instead, it
opened a long dialogue-sometimes a heated argument-that has
lasted now for almost two centuries." 71 Yet although the dialogue
has endured, the terms in which the debate is carried on have been
visibly transformed.
A. In Absentia: The Vanishing of the Religious Justification
A striking feature distinguishing the founding generation's
discussions of religious freedom from similar discussions in the
twentieth century is that the religious justification, so prominent in
the earlier period, has largely vanished from the modern debates.
To be sure, vestiges or reminders of that justification still appear
from time to time. In Zorach v. Clatuon,72 justice Douglas declared
that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." 8 In academic legal literature, scholars still on
occasion allude to the religious justification.
74
These instances are notable, however, both for their rarity and
for their relative timidity. Justice Douglas's statement is ambiguous;
it can easily be understood as a sociological or historical proposition
rather than as a statement of religious faith. In any event, Douglas's
rhetoric in Zorach represented an idiosyncratic strand in modern
judicial opinions. Justice Douglas has been "[t]he only Justice to
assert a religious justification at all explicitly."75 And although
scholars sometimes allude to the religious justification in their
historical discussions, 76 they rarely if ever offer the same argument
7 1 JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
258 (1990).
72 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
73 Id. at 313.
74 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 32, at 1496-99 (discussing the meaning of the
religiousjustification in the founding period); cf. Ingber, supra note 5, at 285-87,292,
332 (presenting an argument similar to the view expressed by Madison in Memorial
and Remonstrance, not for the purpose ofjustifying religious freedom, but rather to
define religion and to distinguish religious from non-religious claims).
75 Smith, supra note 15, at 104; see also HaroldJ. Berman, Religion and Law: The
First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 EMoRY L.J. 777, 779 (1986) (noting that
in contrast to earlier periods, "in the twentieth century the interpretation of [the
religion] clauses has been based almost entirely on a political, and not on a religious
concept").76 S ee George Anastaplo, Church and State: Explorations, 19 LOY. U. CuI. LJ. 61,
191 (1987); McConnell,supra note 32, at 1496-99; Williams & Williams, supra note 18,
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for contemporary use. Perhaps the closest instance, as I shall argue
later, turns out to be quite different in character; it can more
accurately be understood as a plea for public agnosticism than as a
faithful modern rendering of the religious justification.
77
In short, one simply does not encounter in contemporary
judicial opinions or law review articles anything like Jefferson's
positive, unembarrassed declaration that religious liberty is essential
because "almighty God hath created the mind free" or because any
infringement upon religious freedom is a "departure from the plan
of the Holy Author of our religion."78 The religious justification
for religious freedom has lost its status in current constitutional
discourse. In view of the significance of that justification in
producing the initial commitment to religious liberty, its virtual
disappearance from contemporary discourse calls for explanation.
Two kinds of explanations present themselves. First, in the
current intellectual climate, the religious justification may simply be
implausible-it may rest upon assumptions that no longer seem
tenable. The process of secularization may have deprived the
religious justification of its power to persuade. Second, the
religious justification may still be plausible, but for other reasons it
may be regarded as inadmissible in academic and legal debate. This
possibility is less straightforward than the implausibility explanation,
but the notion that an argument can be relevant and even persua-
sive yet at the same time inadmissible should hardly seem foreign
to lawyers. For example, facts that everyone considers to be
relevant are routinely excluded from consideration at trial by the
rules of evidence. 79 Other discourses have similar admissibility
restrictions. In certain social contexts, everyone understands there
at 853-58. Even in that context, the religiousjustification is often filtered out. Howe
noted that "[i]t is hard for the present generation of emancipated Americans to
conceive the possibility that the framers of the Constitution were willing to
incorporate some theological presuppositions in the framework of federal govern-
ment." HOWE, supra note 34, at 8.
77 See infra part III.B.
78 Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 1986),
reprinted in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 19, at xvii.
79 Evidentiary restrictions are formal and explicit; other constraints are unwritten
but no less real. Asked by an appellate court to explain a troublesome precedent, for
instance, a lawyer is likely to offer a "legal" account rather than a psychological or
political explanation. The lawyer and the judges might be legal realists who believe
that a psychological or political explanation is in fact more illuminating, but in the
context of appellate argument it is inadmissible to assert that a previous judge made
a particular decision because she had an authoritarian personality or was a Carter
appointee.
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are some kinds of statements-"My, but you've been putting on
weight" or "This conversation is really tedious, isn't it?"-that simply
are not made, even if (or especially if) they are obviously true. It is
possible that the religious justification is excluded from current
legal and academic debate by analogous admissibility restrictions.
8 0
Both possibilities-that the religious justification is implausible and
that it is inadmissible-deserve examination.
B. The Secularization Hypothesis: Is the Religious
Justification Plausible Today?
The suggestion that the religious justification is implausible is
closely correlated with what might be called the secularization
hypothesis. This hypothesis perceives in modern history a process of
steady secularization, with a concomitant decline in religious
belief.81 This diagnosis, if accurate, could provide a fully adequate
explanation for the disappearance of the religious justification from
constitutional discourse: it would be entirely natural that with the
loss of religious belief judges and scholars would cease to rely on
arguments that are dependent on such beliefs.
The secularization hypothesis has recently been challenged,
however, by sociologists, historians, and public opinion research-
ers.8 2 In a perceptive essay, Martin Marty argues that from the
time of the exploration of the American continent onward, the
80 See David M. Smolin, TheJudeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in Legal
Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345, 345-47 (1988) (describing as "self-censorship"
the common assumption that theistic andJudeo-Christian beliefs cannot properly be
invoked in support of legal arguments).
81 One commentator contends that "[s]ecularization has continued apace in the
intervening two centuries [since the adoption of the First Amendment], and the
struggle for predominance between a fundamentally religious and a fundamentally
secular worldview is long since over in western intellectual, political and legal
thought." Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 299, 306-07; see also Leo Pfeffer, Issues that Divide: The Triumph of Secular
Humanism, 19 J. CHURCH & ST. 203, 211 (1977) (arguing that "the now rapid
movement towards secularization is certain to continue").
82 See RonaldJ. McAllister, Religion in the Public Arena: A Paradox of Secularization,
30 J. CHURCH & ST. 15, 16 (1988) (noting that evidence fails to support the
"traditional view" which holds that "the forces of secularization are unidirectional,
disbarring religion and enervating religious values"); see also Everett C. Ladd, Secular
and Religious America, in UNSECULAR AMERICA 14, 14 (RichardJ. Neuhaus ed., 1986)
[hereinafter UNSECULAR AMERICA] ("A quarter century ago there was something
approaching consensus.., that America had entered a period in which religion was
in a permanent state of weakness or decline. Today, few scholars feel sure that this
is so, and some feel quite the opposite.").
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anticipation of imminent secularization has been perennial, and
perennially disappointed. 8 William Lee Miller adds:
The successive waves of American intelligentsia keep expecting
religion to have vanished; or they write as though it has already
done so, and then are continually surprised that it has not ....
[T]hey say, about religious affirmations, "nobody believes that
anymore." One is reminded of the statement that Yogi Berra is
said to have made about a well-known restaurant: "Nobody goes
there anymore. It's too crowded."
8 4
Given these divergent assessments, one may wonder how
convincing is the evidence for the secularization hypothesis.
Perhaps the strongest argument favoring the theory stems from a
negative inference. If religious belief remains strong and pervasive,
one would expect to find abundant public manifestations of that
belief. Such manifestations were, after all, pervasive in the colonial
and founding periods.8 5 In some social domains, however, this
evidence is conspicuously absent today. For example, a foreign
observer who studied American movies and network television
might naturally conclude that religion had wholly lost its signifi-
cance in American life.
8 6
The evidence supporting this negative inference is mixed,
however, at best. Although genuine religion may have largely disap-
peared from movies, television, and the public school classroom,
8 7
church attendance is reportedly as high as ever,8 8 and politicians
83 See Martin E. Marty, The Sacred and Secular in American History, in TRANSFORM-
ING FAITH: THE SACRED AND SECULAR IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (M.L.
Bradbury &James B. Gilbert eds., 1989) [hereinafter TRANSFORMING FAITH]. Marty
cautions against interpretations that divide the sacred from the secular, arguing that
we have a "religio-secular, operative-passional, sacro-secular life and society." Id. at
8.
84 Miller, supra note 26, at 36-37.
8 See supra text accompanying note 31.
86 Cf Frederick M. Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values:
Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modem America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1581
(1987) ("[O]ne looks in vain for a television family that attends services, even if only
on Christmas or Easter (or Rosh Hashanah or Yom Kippur). Such depictions of
religious devotion passed from the cultural scene long ago."); see also ADAMS &
EMMERICH, supra note 14, at 49 ("In modern advertising media, religion is invariably
excluded so as not to offend potential consumers, hence reinforcing the irrelevance
of spiritual values to public life.").
Religion's disappearance from the public schools provides equivocal evidence
of the status of religious beliefs in the culture, of course, because that disappearance
was to a significant extent the product ofjudicial decree.
8 8 SeeANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN AMERICA 42-56 (James A. Davis
& John Modell eds., 1989).
RISE AND FALL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
still find it natural and apparently profitable to employ religious
symbols and rhetoric.8 9 Nevertheless, even to the extent it is
factually well-founded this negative argument is inconclusive
because there is another possible interpretation of the evidence,
which can be called the privatization hypothesis. This position holds
that religious belief is still pervasive, but that believers have come
to view their religious faith as a private matter not properly invoked
in public discussion. 90 In this vein, Thomas Luckmann contends
that what has changed in modern society is the "location" of
religion. 91 He acknowledges that "religion is not disappearing
from modern society and ... it is anything but shrinking."9 2 Yet
the pervading theme in modern religion is "privatization": individu-
als view religion not as a force that may properly influence public
policies, but rather as an aid with individual concerns such as "'self-
realization,' personal autonomy, and self-expression."
93
Either the secularization or the privatization explanation might
account for the relative dearth, at least in some social contexts, of
public manifestations of religious belief. On the first interpretation,
the lack of these manifestations reveals an actual loss of belief; in
89 See Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 863, 864-65 (1986) (describing and criticizing the use of religious rhetoric and
imagery by Ronald Reagan,JesseJackson, andJimmy Carter); cf. Gedicks & Hendrix,
supra note 86, at 1596 n.78 (noting that "churches and other religious organizations
are heavily engaged in movements relating to arms control, abortion restrictions,
suppression ofpornography, American policy in Central America, disinvestment and
anti-apartheid in South Africa,.. . immigration policy, and so-called morals legislation
such as anti-prostitution and anti-sodomy laws"). For useful overviews of the
influence of religion on American politics, see ROBERT B. FOWLER, RELIGION AND
POLITICS IN AMERICA (1985), and A.JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
LIFE 168-339 (1985).
go See Frederick M. Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 419, 421 (1990) (observing that "there is in the
United States a strong cultural assumption that religion should be private, and politics
should be secular").
91 See Thomas Luckmann, Shrinking Transcendence, Expanding Religion?, 51 SOC.
ANALYSIS 127, 132 (1990).
92 Id. at 127.
93 Id. at 138. As a European scholar interested in religion in Western societies
generally, Luckmann may be less accurate with respect to the role of religion in the
United States. Data suggest that religious belief and commitment are dramatically
higher in this country than in most European countries. See generally Theodore
Caplow, Contrasting Trends in European and American Religion, 46 Soc. ANALYSIS 101,
102-03 (1985) (offering data which reveal a greater "religious vitality" in the United
States than in Europe). Nevertheless, Robert Wuthnow offers a diagnosis of
American religion that is similar to Luckmann's more general assessment. See
ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 300 (1988).
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the other view, the absence of public manifestations of belief only
shows that believers are keeping their faith to themselves. As
between these explanations, the privatization explanation is the
more plausible, at least with respect to the general population.
What proves decisive on this question is the abundance of survey
and sociological evidence indicating the continuing strength of
religious belief:
Upwards of 90 percent of the American population affirms some
belief in the existence of God.... [N]ine persons in ten believe
Jesus Christ actually lived, seven in ten believe he was truly God,
and six in ten think one must believe in the divinity of Christ to be
a Christian. The results of studies documenting consistently high
levels of belief in life after death, heaven, and Christ's presence in
heaven also point to the survival of a strong element of religious
dualism in American culture.
94
Localized studies and data reinforce this survey evidence. In an
intensive study of Muncie, Indiana-the "Middletown" of repeated
sociological studies beginning early in this century-a team of
sociologists concluded that the "secularization" thesis was flatly
incorrect. The evidence showed, if anything, a trend toward
"sacralization." 95  Data from Brooklyn, New York, support a
similar conclusion.
96
The analysis thus far has considered the persistence of religious
belief in the public at large and suggested that the privatization
thesis is more consistent with the available data than the seculariza-
tion thesis. It is possible, however, that a different assessment is
warranted for the more educated part of the population, sometimes
referred to as the "knowledge class," to which judges, lawyers, and
legal academicians belong. Some scholars have suggested that
academicians form a distinct "intellectual subsociety"97 whose
94 WUTHNOW, supra note 93, at 300; see also GREELEY, supra note 88, at 13-20
(arguing that data show stability in Americans' central doctrinal beliefs); Caplow,
supra note 93, at 103 ("America is distinctly more pious [today] than two generations
ago.").
9 5 See THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., ALL FArrHFUL PEOPLE: CHANGE AND
CONTINUITY IN MIDDLETOWN'S RELIGION 297 (1983). For an argument challenging
the Middletown study, see Norval D. Glenn, The Trend in "No Religion" Respondents
to U.S. National Surveys, Late 1950s to Early 1980s, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. 293 (1987).
On the basis of an increase in the percentage of persons who reported they had no
religion-a percentage that at all times remained in the single digits-Glenn infers a
broad secularizing tendency in this country that continued from the 1950s until about
1980, but apparently reversed itself in the 1980s. See id. at 311-12.
96 See WUTHNOW, supra note 93, at 4.
97 See Milton M. Gordon, The Intellectual Subsociety, in THE PROFEssORS: WORK
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values and beliefs may differ significantly from those of citizens
generally. Thus, the disappearance of the religious justification for
religious freedom and of religious arguments from legal debate
might be explained as the consequence of a loss of religious faith
not in the general population, but rather in the "knowledge class,"
and in particular among judges, lawyers, and legal academicians.
98
In contrast to the general secularization hypothesis, the
possibility of a localized, class-based loss of religious belief is harder
to evaluate. The argument based on a negative inference from the
lack of public religiosity seems stronger in the academic context.
Henry May claims that "since the First World War or a little earlier,
religion has ceased to have a place in the established culture of the
intellectuals." 9 9 The absence of overt manifestations of religiosity
within intellectual culture creates a strong impression of seculariza-
tion. Although he goes on to challenge the accuracy of the
depiction, James Boyd White describes the common view as follows:
There is a peculiar division between academic and religious
thought in our culture. In the academic world we tend to speak
as though all participants in our conversations were purely rational
actors engaged in rational debate; perhaps some people out there
in the world are sufficiently benighted that they turn to religious
beliefs or other superstitions, but that is not true of us or, if it is
true, we hide it, and it ought not be true of them. Ours is a
secular academy and, we think, a secular state.
100
Once again, however, the negative inference is fragile. In
academic culture, as in the culture at large, the absence of explicit
and public religiosity might be the result of a "privatization," not of
a "secularization" entailing the actual loss of religious faith.10 1
AND LIFE STYLES AMONG ACADEMICIANS 219,219-21 (Charles H. Anderson &John D.
Murray eds., 1971). For a recent, much discussed argument depicting legal theory
as a tool of the "knowledge class" in opposition to the general public, see ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1989).
98 For a discussion of the lack of religious faith among intellectuals, see Smolin,
supra note 80, at 388-94.
99 
HENRY F. MAY, IDEAS, FAITHS, AND FEELINGS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN INTELLEC-
TUAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY 1952-1982, at 158 (1983).
100 James B. White, Response to Roger Cramton's Article, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 533, 533
(1987). Similarly, speaking from his broad experience in the legal academy, Kent
Greenawalt reports that "[a] good many professors and other intellectuals display a
hostility or skeptical indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised
contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry and
ordinary human experience." KENT GREENAwALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1988).
101 This possibility is implicitly recognized even in the observations ofjames Boyd
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The data on this point are inconclusive. Survey evidence from the
1980s, however, suggests that most of the more educated citizens
hold religious beliefs. 10 2 Among college graduates in this coun-
try, only 3% say they do not believe in God, while 77% report that
their relationship with God is either "extremely close" or "somewhat
close." 0 3 The percentage of college graduates who believe in life
after death (76%) is the same as that for the general popula-
tion, 10 4 and the percentage of college graduates who attend
church nearly every week (30%) is slightly higher than the national
average. 10 5  College graduates express greater confidence in
organized religion than persons who have graduated from high
school only.'0 6 And although college graduates are far less likely
to be biblical literalists, 80% believe the Bible to be the "actual word
of God" or the "inspired word of God."
10 7
Even though the category of college graduates may not be
coextensive with "the knowledge class" or the "intellectual sub-
society," college graduates comprise and, presumably, are influ-
enced by that subculture. Hence, the persistence of high levels of
religious belief among college graduates at least casts doubt on the
proposition that intellectuals and academicians have generally lost
their religious faith.
In addition, survey evidence reveals that 63% of educators
regard themselves as "religious"; the figure for individuals in
vocations associated with law and justice is 53%."0 More than
White and Kent Greenawalt quoted above. White recognizes that "if it is true [that
academics hold religious beliefs], we hide it." White, supra note 100, at 533
(emphasis added). Greenawalt, although discerning academic hostility to religion,
asserts that this hostility is "disguised." GREENAWALT, supra note 100, at 6. But if the
hostility is "disguised," how does Greenawalt know that it exists? One likely
possibility is that Greenawalt infers hostility to religion from the conspicuous failure
of academics to acknowledge or invoke it. But it is also possible that academics do
not invoke religious beliefs in public discussions because they regard such beliefs as
personal or private in nature.
102 See UNSECULAR AMERICA, supra note 82, app. at 142, tbl. 20; cf Ladd, supra
note 82, at 22-23 (noting that survey evidence reveals no significant differences in
religiosity on the basis of education or age differences).
0 See UNSECULAR AMERICA, supra note 82, app. at 142, tbl. 20.
104 See id. at 141. In addition, compared to the general population, college
graduates appear to have more definite and positive ideas about what the next life
will be like. See id. at 136.
105 See id. at 139.
106 See id. at 138. Confidence in organized religion is higher still among persons
who have not graduated from high school. See id.
107 See id. at 143.
108 See id. at 146.
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three-quarters of those in both groups attend church at least
occasionally, and over one third attend frequently.10 9 About the
same percentages participate occasionally, or frequently, in
prayer.110 Thus, although religion may have largely disappeared
from intellectual culture, its absence does not necessarily reflect any
comparable decline of faith among the individuals who compose
that culture. It appears, rather, that many participants in intellectu-
al or academic culture continue to hold religious beliefs but do not
view those beliefs as matters to be properly invoked in public
discussion.
111
A recent study of religiosity among psychotherapists provides
indirect support for this interpretation. 112 Like lawyers and legal
academics, psychotherapists undergo years of education beyond the
undergraduate level. Unlike lawyers, psychotherapists receive
training that might, in a fairly direct way, challenge or undermine
religious faith. Most casebooks, legal treatises, and legal articles do
not directly speak to religious belief; by contrast, seminal figures in
psychology, particularly Freud, have explained religious belief as a
form of wish-fulfillment and illusion.11 3 Accordingly, psychother-
apists might be expected to be especially secularized, and they have
often been perceived as such.114 The recent study confirms that
by most indicators psychotherapists are indeed less religious than
the general population.115 Nonetheless, 77% of the psychothera-
pists surveyed agreed with the statement: "I try hard to live my life
according to my religious beliefs. " 116 Moreover, 46% agreed with
the statement: "My whole approach to life is based on my reli-
gion."117 In addition, 41% indicated that they attend religious
109 See id. at 139.
'10 See id. at 147.
Ill Cf Smolin, supra note 80, at 415 (arguing that"[t]oo many [Christian scholars]
have been content to relegate their faiths to their private lives, while moving quietly
and safely amongst their colleagues").
112 See Allen E. Bergin &Jay P. Jensen, Religiosity of Psychotherapists: A National
Survey, 27 PSYCHOTHERAPY 3 (1990).
llSee, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 25-58 (W.D. Robson-
Scott trans., 1928). For a discussion of Freud's "psychoanalytic atheism," see HANS
KONG, DOES GOD ExIsT? 262-323 (Edward Quinn trans., Vintage Books 1981) (1978).
114 See Bergin &Jensen, supra note 112, at 3.
115 For example, 20% of the psychotherapists surveyed were atheists, agnostics, or
without any religious preference. The same was true of only 9% of the public at
large. See id. at 4-5.
See id. at 5. In comparison, 84% of the general population agreed with the
similar statement: "I try hard to put my religious beliefs into practice in my relations
with all people." See id.
1 17 See id. In contrast, 72% of the general public agreed with the similar
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services regularly.1 18 Thus, the perception of a lack of religious
faith among psychotherapists apparently reflects a privatization of
religious belief, not outright secularization.
19
Thomas Shaffer provides impressionistic support for a similar
conclusion with specific reference to the legal profession. Shaffer
observes that he and other legal educators "have taught scores of
law students who came to, lived through, and left law school with
firm, active religious commitments." 120 But these students quick-
ly learned that their religious convictions were not to be appealed
to in legal discussions:
A remarkable thing happens to these students when they start
talking about public law; they come to regard themselves as
culturally disembodied. Ihlere is something about the way lawyers
are trained, and I suspect it is the constitutional law teachers who
do this, that makes even the most pious believer look at her church
as if she were not in it anymore. She learns, for professional
purposes, to stand on the courthouse steps and look at the
community that formed her as if being a lawyer had removed her
to a new community, even though that has not happened, even
though she is still very much in the community she came from-
teaches Sunday school, sings in the choir, tithes, and serves on the
board.121
Other legal scholars offer comparable observations. Discussing
the problem of teaching values in the legal curriculum, Roger
Cramton noted that for himself and other legal educators religious
beliefs are often an important source of values. 122 This religious
foundation might easily go unnoticed, however, because deeply held
moral beliefs in general, and religious beliefs in particular, are not
likely to appear in any law school discussion. The presentation of
such personal beliefs in that context, Cramton observed, conflicts
with "the tacit agreement of academic culture, at least in recent
times, that the classroom is to be resolutely secular and 'value-
statement: "My religious faith is the most important influence in my life." See id.
118 See id. at 4.
119 The researchers concluded that "[t]here... appears to be a significant degree
of unrecognized religiousness among therapists. Some of this religious interest is
expressed in conventional ways, such as in affiliation and attendance, but a sizeable
portion appears to be less conventional and more personal in form." Id. at 6.
120 Thomas L. Shaffer, On Checking the Artifacts of Canaan: A Comment on
Levinson's "Confrontation," 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1990).
121 Id.
122 See Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinarj Religion, 37J. LEGAL EDUc. 509,515
(1987).
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free. '"'123 In response, James Elkins agreed that "[m]any of us are
acutely aware of the need for a spiritual sensibility in our professing
and in our profession." 124 But the difficulty is that "[r]eligion and
law make for odd talk.... A conversation that admits the reality of
religion and spiritual values violates our perception of public and
private, social and personal." 125 These observations support the
general survey evidence: both suggest that the "privatization" thesis
is a more accurate description of general and academic culture than
the more unqualified "secularization" thesis.
To be sure, the conclusion that the scarcity of public manifesta-
tions of religious belief reflects a privatization of faith, rather than
a loss of faith, rests partially upon survey evidence limited in what
it can prove.1 26 Survey evidence measures religiosity at a relative-
ly superficial level. Data reporting the prevalence of belief in God,
in an afterlife, and in the Bible reflect the propositions to which
subjects give intellectual assent, but such data do not show whether
that assent is based on serious reflection or merely on habit or
tradition; nor does the survey evidence measure the strength or
depth of the subjects' religious convictions.
127
Although the survey evidence measures religiosity primarily on
the level of intellectual assent, it is that level which is most pertinent
to the question at issue. The evidence suggests that large majorities
of Americans, including more educated Americans, at least give
intellectual assent to traditional religious beliefs. Whatever the
strength of their religious commitments, Americans continue to find
these beliefs plausible. Indeed, it is quite likely that many, or even
most, Americans would assent to both the priority claim 128 and
the voluntariness claim. 129  Consequently, the disappearance of
the religious justification from modern discourse cannot be
123 Id. at 516.
124 James R. Elkins, Reflections on the Religion Called Legal Education, 37J. LEGAL
EDuc. 522, 525 (1987).
125 Id. at 527.
126 For a discussion of some of the complexities in religious faith that survey
evidence could not hope to capture, see infra part IV.G.
127 Even so, data showing relatively high and stable levels of church attendance
and prayer would seem to reflect more than mere intellectual assent. See GREELEY,
supra note 88, at 42-66.12 8 SeeJ. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327,
336 (1969) (asserting that "most Americans also feel sympathy for the proposition
that the theist's highest duty is to serve God").
129 See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 770 ("Volitionalism pervades
American thinking about law, politics, religion, and morality.").
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adequately explained by the hypothesis that its religious premises
are viewed as implausible. Something more complex seems to be
going on. It is likely that the religious justification, along with
religious beliefs generally, is not regarded as implausible but rather
as inadmissible in public debate.
C. The Controversial Character of Religious Belief
The foregoing discussion suggests that there is nothing in the
propositional content of common religious beliefs that renders them
a priori irrelevant to public concerns. If beliefs in God, the Bible,
and basic Judeo-Christian precepts were pertinent to public issues
like religious freedom two centuries ago, beliefs expressed in similar
terms would presumably be pertinent to those issues today.
Nonetheless, many believers, particularly in academic culture, seem
to regard their religious beliefs as inadmissible in public debate.
The question is: why?
In the next section I argue that the inadmissibility of religious
beliefs, and of the religious justification for religious freedom in
particular, is in part a consequence of what we have come to
understand religious freedom to mean. Before pursuing that
argument, however, it may be useful to consider an alternative
explanation closely associated with the view that religious beliefs are
no longer plausible. A modification of the secularization hypothe-
sis, this explanation suggests that even if most Americans, including
more educated Americans, continue to hold religious beliefs, the
crucial fact is that significant numbers of Americans do not hold
such beliefs. In the founding period, James Turner has argued,
disbelief in God was not an intellectual option for Americans:
although charges of "atheist" and "infidel" were bandied about,
there were for practical purposes no true atheists in this coun-
try.l13 Today, by contrast, persons who reject all conventional
religious belief constitute a minority, but their presence is undeni-
able. In addition, religious believers in this country may differ more
substantially in the content of their beliefs than they did two
centuries ago.13 ' In short, the critical change is that religious
130 See supra note 29.
131 See MARY F. BEDNAROWSKI, AMERICAN RELIGION: A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
2-3 (1984) (describing the wide variety of religions in the United States today). But
see R. LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICANS 205
(1986) (observing that "although one can count hundreds of religious groups in the
United States, the vast majority of religious Americans have gravitated toward a small
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belief, however widespread, is now openly controversial, and
therefore genuinely optional. And precisely because it is optional,
religious belief cannot serve as a solid ground or starting place for
legal or academic discussion.132 After all, "the orator who builds
his discourse on premises not accepted by the audience commits a
classical fallacy in argumentation-a petitio principii."
i33
Initially, this explanation for the disappearance of the religious
justification from academic and judicial discourse seems eminently
plausible. Nonetheless, the contention that the religious justifica-
tion is inadmissible because its religious premises are controversial
does not provide a complete and satisfactory explanation for that
justification's disappearance from contemporary discourse. The
difficulty is that the explanation's premise-that controversial beliefs
cannot provide suitable grounds for legal or academic argument-
has little force outside the specific domain of religious belief.
134
Legal scholars normally do not hesitate to rely upon theories or
beliefs just because those theories or beliefs are rejected by many of
their colleagues. Quite to the contrary, scholarly literature teems
with analyses and arguments based upon the views or theories of
Aristotle, Bentham, Derrida, Dewey, Gadamer, Habermas, Hegel,
Kant, Marx, Merleau-Ponty, Mill, Pierce, Rawls, Rorty, and
Wittgenstein, to name a few. None of these thinkers or their
theories even approach general acceptance. Indeed, it seems
unlikely that more than a minority of legal scholars-in some cases
number of 'mainline' denominations"). At the. end of the nineteenth century the ten
largest denominations accounted for 75% of the American population; today they
represent 90%. See id. at 206.
132 One writer observes:
By the midpoint of the 19th century, it had become clear that no single
religious denomination would ever dominate the American cultural scene
.... As a consequence, there was no single denominational language that
was adequate to the task of communication among such a theologically
diverse population. Of necessity, Americans began to move toward a less
sectarian language in public life. It was only by using a more secular
language that one could carry on public business and dialogue without
importing into the discussion... divisive theological differences ....
Gedicks, supra note 28, at 120; see also Kenneth A. Strike, Are Seculargthical Languages
Religiously Neutral?, 6J.L. & POL. 469, 470 (1990) ("A people with diverse religious
commitments, or none, need a common ethical language that is both secular and
reliiously neutral.").
l33 CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HuMANITIEs 14-15 (1979).
134 Cf Stephen L. Carter, The Inaugural Development Fund Lectures: Scientific
Liberalism, Scientistic Law, 69 OR. L. REv. 471, 500 (1990) ("[W]hat about the point
that we are as morally diverse as we are religiously diverse, and yet we allow all sorts
of moral views to be expressed and even imposed? How is religion different?").
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hardly more than a handful-subscribes to any of the theories.
Nonetheless, it is common and apparently respectable for legal
scholars to invoke the authority of these thinkers or to use their
theories as grounds for legal debate.
Reliance upon controversial premises in public argument is not
only common, but inevitable. In a diverse, pluralistic culture there
are few if any beliefs that approach universal acceptance, and
generally shared beliefs are likely to prove inadequate to resolve
many specific issues that need to be addressed. With respect to
numerous moral and political issues, for example, public argument
inevitably rests upon competing premises that are often controver-
sial and incommensurable. 135 After an extensive analysis, Kent
Greenawalt concludes that "any hope that all political issues can be
resolved solely on the basis of commonly shared premises about
values and commonly shared approaches to factual knowledge must
be abandoned."
136
Given this situation, it is unsatisfactory to explain the disappear-
ance of the religious justification from legal discourse merely by
noting that the justification's religious assumptions are controver-
sial. Something more complicated appears to be at work. 137 It
seems that even citizens and scholars who accept and act upon
religious beliefs in their personal lives, and who are also quite
comfortable invoking controversial nonreligious premises or theories
in public discussions, nonetheless assume that religious beliefs are
inadmissible in public discourse about matters such as constitutional
law. In the following section I propose an explanation for that
perceived inadmissibility.
III. THE SELF-CANCELLATION OF THE RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION
The answer to the question of why the religious justification
should be regarded as inadmissible in legal and academic debate is
surely multifaceted.12 8 In the discussion to follow I do not pre-
135 See ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6-8 (2d ed. 1984).
136 GREENAWALT, supra note 100, at 216.
137 Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further
Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019, 1035 (1990) ("Considering the extent to which
Americans regard themselves as religious, the marginalization of religion in our
culture's intellectual life ... is somewhat surprising....").
138 See Stephen Hart, Privatization in American Religion and Society, 47 Soc.
ANALYSIS 319, 321-25 (1987) (discussing various sources of religious privatization).
For discussions linking the exclusion of religion from public discourse to broader
intellectual and political currents related to the Enlightenment, the rise of liberalism,
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tend to provide a comprehensive account, but instead emphasize
one important factor that has contributed to this cultural phenome-
non. I will suggest that the discourse restriction precluding use of
the religious justification can be understood as a natural conse-
quence of what may be called the prohibitory interpretation of
religious freedom. In this interpretation, constitutional religious
freedom operates as a prohibition forbidding governmental reliance
upon religious doctrines or beliefs in the formulation of public
policy. Ronald Dworkin expresses this view when he asserts that
"the Constitution does not allow states to justify policy on grounds
of religious doctrine." 13 9 As the prohibitory interpretation has
gained acceptance, 140 it is not surprising that our legal and
academic discourse cease to advance the religious justification as a
rationale for religious freedom. The religious justification, after all,
is precisely the kind of religious belief or rationale that the
prohibitory interpretation excludes as a basis of public policy.
1 41
and the development of science, see Carter, supra note 134, and Gedicks, supra note
28, at 116-26.
19 Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Death, N.Y. REv. BooKs,Jan. 31, 1991, at 14,17.
140 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommoda-
tion of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REv.
75, 179 (1990) ("[T]he establishment clause removed from political discourse the final
resort to the Almighty that had previously characterized determinations of political
truth .... Religious values ... cannot be written into law ... ."); Ira C. Lupu,
Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 739,746 n.30 (1986) (arguing that the religion clauses require elimination of "all
references to God in public life"); Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?,
27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1075 (1986) (arguing that the roles of public officials may
preclude their use of religious reasoning); Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution of
Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 733 (1986) (observing that "the liberal political
tradition excludes religion from public life"); cf. LEO PFEFFER, CREEDS IN COMPETITION
43 (1958) (equating "the separation of church and state" with "the secular state");
JOHN M. SWOMLEY, RELIcIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SECULAR STATE 17 (1987) (contend-
ing that the "constitutional doctrine of separation of church and state" means that
"[t]he Constitution ... provides for a wholly secular government"); Gail Merel, The
Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 813 (1978) (asserting that the American
constitutional democracy is "a political order that is ultimately premised upon a
wholly secular politics");James E. Wood,Jr., "No Religious Test Shall EverBeRequired ':
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, 29J. CHURCH & ST. 199, 207-08
(1987) (arguing that the Constitution makes the United States "a secular state").
141 Michael Smith observes:
The Supreme Court has laid down the rule that government may not act
toward religion for religious purposes. Presumably, "religious purposes"
include contentions about God's will and value judgments that relate to
religion alone. If so, not to hinder religion because that is what God wills
is to act for religious reasons. Thisjustification violates the very rule against
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If government is forbidden to act upon a particular rationale, for
lawyers or legal academicians to assert and debate the rationale
would at best be futile, while at worst it might taint or invalidate
policies that correspond to prescriptions derived from the forbidden
rationale.
A. Emergence of the Prohibitory Interpretation
The prohibitory interpretation of religious freedom is neither
inevitable nor uncontroversial. 142  Michael Sandel observes that
"the reigning interpretation of religious liberty is not characteristic
of the American constitutional tradition as such, but a recent
development that departs from earlier understandings." 14 3  In
fact, the prohibitory interpretation stands in tension not only with
the constitutional history recounted above, which reflects the fact
that a religious rationale was employed in the achievement of
religious freedom, but also with the prevailing early understanding
of religious freedom, which emphasized the institutional separation
of church and state, not the insulation of government from religious
beliefs and values.' 44 In addition, the prohibitory interpretation
conflicts with much of our subsequent political history in which
religious beliefs have actively influenced public policies of all kinds,
ranging from abolition to prohibition to civil rights legislation.
1 45
Nonetheless, the initial commitment to a modest, institutional
interpretation of religious freedom contained the germ of its own
expansion. That potential was discernible in the thinking of James
religious purposes to which it ostensibly gives rise.
Smith, supra note 15, at 117.
142 For contemporary scholarship that rejects the prohibitory interpretation, see
MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOvE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN
AMERICAN POLrIcs (forthcoming 1991); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout
Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the
"Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989).
14 Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF
FAITH, supra note 26, at 77.
144 1 have argued at greater length for this interpretation in Smith, supra note 142.
See also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 14, at 51 (asserting that "the Founders
conceived of separation in institutional rather than cultural terms"); WINTHROP S.
HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 102 (4th ed. 1987) (arguing that "when the First
Amendment was adopted no one thought that 'separation of church and state'...
implied any separation of religion and politics").
145 See Edward M. GaffneyJr., On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality
of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1, 9-16 (1990); Michael E. Smith, Religious Activism: The Historical Record, 27
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1087 (1986).
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Madison, an early proponent of religious freedom. As noted,
Madison forcefully invoked the religious justification during the
struggle for religious freedom in Virginia. 146 In 1789, Madison
again expressed what seems a modest conception of the scope of
religious freedom when as a member of Congress he proposed what
became the religion clauses of the First Amendment. He explained
in Congress that the amendment meant only "that Congress should
not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observance of it by
law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to
their conscience." 147 Madison was also a member of the commit-
tee that recommended the institution of a congressional chaplain,
and he apparently voiced no objection either to the chaplaincy plan
or to the resolution calling for a national day of "public thanksgiv-
ing and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging ... the many
signal favors of Almighty God ... ."148 However, later in life,
especially after retiring from the presidency, Madison seems to have
moved toward a more expansive position regarding the meaning of
separation; he condemned both the chaplain system and religious
proclamations such as the thanksgiving resolution.
49
Madison's thinking hardly charted an inevitable path. His later
opinions cannot plausibly be viewed as the mere working out of
necessary or logical entailments of his earlier commitment to the
separation of religious and governmental institutions. On the
contrary, it is perfectly coherent to hold that the religion clauses
require a formal institutional separation of church and state-or to
maintain, in Jefferson's famous phrase, that the First Amendment
erects a "wall of separation between church and State"1 5°-without
also calling for government to be sealed off from religious beliefs or
prohibited from supporting religious values and symbols.151 If,
however, the evolution in Madison's opinions is not logically
146 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
147 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James
Madison), quoted in ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 10 (1982).
148 CORD, supra note 147, at 23-29.
149 Id. at 29-36.
150 The famous metaphor occurred in a letter written byJefferson to the Danbury
Connecticut Baptist Association in 1802. The letter is reprinted in THE COMPLETE
JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 518-19.
151 I have elsewhere argued that when the problem is considered in light of our
political traditions and our constitutional commitments to other values such as the
freedoms of speech and belief, the early "institutional separation" position is more
coherent than its modern successors. See Smith, supra note 142, at 985-1015.
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inexorable, that evolution does represent a natural dialectical or
conceptual progression-and one which has been broadly repeated
in modern religion clause jurisprudence.
Thus, one can easily understand how a citizen-or a scholar or
judge-might come to regard the prohibitory interpretation of
religious freedom as axiomatic. In the first place, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies, the
resulting policies require conformity to what some citizens may
regard as religious programs or agendas.' 52 An obvious example
is the case of abortion. Suppose a state legislature places restric-
tions on the availability of abortion because legislators and citizens
believe on religious grounds that abortion is tantamount to murder.
The restrictions will likely be viewed by opponents as requiring
adherence to a religious code of conduct. Of course, the restric-
tions do not force anyone to believe a religious doctrine, or to
affiliate with or worship according to any religion. But the state's
policy does compel nonbelievers to conform to a standard of
conduct inspired in large measure by religious belief. Such
compulsion can be viewed as imposing, at least in one important
matter, a kind of compelled religion, and thus as violating the
commitment to religious freedom.
53
In addition, governmental policies are presumably adopted for
reasons that government accepts as credible. Hence, in relying
upon a religious belief or value as a reason for adopting a particular
policy, government at least tacitly approves or endorses that belief
or value, and thereby tacitly disapproves contrary religious or
nonreligious views that would not support the governing policy.
And one can readily argue that a government which embraces or
152 See Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of
Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53,
69 (1990) (arguing that "government promotes religion ... by offering religious
justifications for policy").
153 In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court upheld the Hyde
Amendment, which forbids the use of federal Medicaid funds to reimburse abortion
costs, against this type of Establishment Clause challenge. The Court ruled that this
measure had not been adopted to further a religious objective but instead merely
"happen[ed] to coincide" with a religious doctrine: "The Hyde Amendment... is as
much a reflection of 'traditionalist' values toward abortion, as it is an embodiment of
the views of any particular religion." Id. at 319. The Court's discussion implies that
if the law had been adopted on religious grounds, it wouldchave violated the
Establishment Clause. Determining whether a law is actually grounded in "religious"
precepts as opposed to "secular" concerns that "happen to coincide" with religious
precepts presents the courts with a virtually impossible and perhaps conceptually
incoherent task. See Smith, supra note 142, at 999-1007.
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endorses particular and controversial religious beliefs is not
providing full religious freedom for its citizens. It may even seem
that citizens whose beliefs are implicitly disapproved are being
treated as second-class citizens.154 Full religious freedom, one
may argue, requires that government be both actually and symboli-
cally neutral in matters of religion; 155 governmental reliance upon
a religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrali-
ty.156
It is not surprising, therefore, that a prohibitory interpretation
of constitutional religious freedom has seemed compelling to a
number of scholars. 157 The appeal of that interpretation is not,
however, limited to scholars. John F. Kennedy, explaining his
understanding of what religious freedom and church-state separa-
tion mean in this country, seems to have embraced a version of the
154 This is the current view of the Supreme Court. See infra parts IV.F, V.A.
155 For a defense of this view, see William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See
It'." The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986). For my
extended criticism of the position, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 266 (1987).
156 The concern for symbolic neutrality is evident in Kent Greenawalt's position,
which contains, if not internal contradictions, at least internal tensions. He has
criticized at length the argument that religious grounds may never properly influence
political decisions. See GREENAWALT, supra note 100, at 6. Nonetheless, he believes
that government officials should not invoke religious values or premises in explaining
orjustifying their decisions because citizens should not be led to believe that a political
decision was made on religious grounds (even, apparently, if it actually was). See
Greenawalt, supra note 137, at 1034-36.157 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text; see also DAVID LYONS, ETHICS
AND THE RULE OF LAW 189-91 (1984) (suggesting that law should not be shaped by
moral judgments); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083,
1089-97 (1990) (arguing that government should use public as opposed to religious
reasons to support its decisions). For descriptions and critical analyses ofversions of
this "prohibitory" position as articulated by John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and
Thomas Nagel, among others, see GREENAWALT, supra note 100, at 30-84; PERRY,
supra note 142.
Although the present discussion is primarily concerned with legal culture, the
prohibitory interpretation's effects on scholars may not be confined to the law
schools. Martin Marty observes:
The First Amendment to the Constitution, because it drew what James
Madison called a line of distinction between civil and religious authorities,
or separated church and state, put a new burden on the public, state-
supported historians. They felt they had to expunge most positive
references to religion in order to be fair, to give equal time to religion by
giving no space to it at all.
Marty, supra note 83, at 7.
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prohibitory interpretation. As a presidential candidate addressing
a group of Protestant ministers, Kennedy asserted:
"[Because] the separation of church and state is absolute [it would
be improper for any] religious body [to] seek to impose its will
directly or indirectly upon the general populace or the public acts
of its officials.... Whatever issue may come before me as
President-on birth control, divorce, censorship, gambling or any
other subject-I will make my decision ... in accordance with what
my conscience tells me to be the national interest, and without
regard to outside religious pressures or dictates. And no power or threat
of punishment could cause me to decide otherwise."
158
Supreme CourtJustices have expressed a similar view regarding
their own judicial responsibilities. After three decades on the
Court, Justice Brennan reported that although he was a Roman
Catholic "as a private citizen," his religious beliefs had never
influenced his position on legal cases because he had, at the time of
his confirmation, "settled in my mind that I had an obligation under
the Constitution which could not be influenced by any of my
religious principles." 159 Justice Scalia has evinced a similar
understanding of his judicial responsibility.1
60
The Supreme Court as a body has not clearly indicated its
acceptance of the prohibitory interpretation, but that interpretation
is implicit in the Court's pronouncements. The Court has repeated-
ly declared that religious freedom means governmental neutrality in
matters of religion.' 6 1 And the Court has on numerous occasions
interpreted this policy of neutrality to prohibit government from
acting except for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects.
162
158 Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion:
Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1047, 1055 (1990) (emphasis added)
(quoting John F. Kennedy). Kennedy's position arguably begs the question of
whether religious beliefs may properly influence public policy. By categorizing the
impermissible religious influence as a kind of outside pressure, Kennedy may have left
open the possibility that his own sincerely held religious values and beliefs could
properly influence the determination of what "my conscience tells me to be the
national interest."
159 Id. at 1063 (quotingJustice Brennan). Brennan seems to have been faithful
to his constitutional principles. See Brennan Wasn't as EisenhowerExpected, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 12, 1990, § 4, at 20 ("As the Catholic voice on the court, his voting record rarely
showed any hint of Catholic morality entering into his decisions.").
160 See Levinson, supra note 158, at 1063-64.
161 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). For a critical discussion, see John T. Vaauri, The
Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PrIT. L. REV. 83 (1986).
16 See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-71 (1990); Lemon v.
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It is difficult to see how government could adopt a public policy
on religious grounds without offending this construction.1 63 Thus
laws or measures that would otherwise be permissible have
nonetheless been invalidated when the Court has discerned a
religious rationale or purpose. 164 To be sure, the principles of
neutrality and governmental secularism are themselves subject to
multiple and sometimes conflicting interpretations; 165 conse-
quently, the implementation of these principles has been chaot-
ic.166  But the basic principles, with their implicit prohibition
against governmental reliance on religious grounds, have remained
central to the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In recent years, moreover, the Court has developed, as a kind of
gloss on the neutrality and secularism requirements, the corollary
idea that government is constitutionally prohibited from acting in
ways that are intended to endorse or disapprove of religion, or that
will be perceived as doing so. 167 The "no endorsement" doctrine
makes clearer what was perhaps only implicit in earlier doctrine-the
Establishment Clause forbids governmental reliance on religious
justifications for public policies. How, after all, could government
embrace and act upon a religious rationale without sending a
message or creating a perception that it has endorsed religion?
B. The Prohibitory Interpretation and the Religious Justification
In view of the widespread acceptance of the prohibitory
interpretation, the disappearance from legal and academic discourse
of the religious justification for religious liberty is understandable.
Why would judges or legal scholars use a religious rationale to
justify a constitutional policy whose central meaning is that public
policies cannot be based on religious rationales? The religious
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
163 Cf Merel, supra note 140, at 809 ("The identification of a secular purpose
necessarily depends upon the determination of what is not, in fact, religious.").
1' See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (declaring "moment of silence"
law invalid because, although permissible in substance, it was adopted for a religious
purpose).
16T5 See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan,J., concurring)
("Neutrality is... a coat of many colors."). John Valauri has argued convincingly that
"[t]he concept of neutrality [in establishment jurisprudence] is... irresolvably and
multiply ambiguous." Vaauri, supra note 161, at 93. For my own analysis of several
different versions of neutrality, see Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78
CAL. L. REV. 305, 313-26 (1990).
116 See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
167 See infra parts IV.F, V.A.
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justification for religious liberty has come to seem incompatible with
religious freedom itself: our constitutional commitment to religious
freedom has been disabled from acknowledging the principal
historical justification for its existence.
At least one contemporary scholar, however, has attempted to
restate the religious justification in terms that might make it suitable
for current use without offending the prohibitory interpreta-
tion. 168  The essence of Michael McConnell's argument is that
"the liberal state .. . cannot reject in principle the possibility that
a religion may be true; and if true, religious claims are of a higher
order than anything in statecraft." 169 He elaborates:
[R]eligious claims-if true-are prior to and of greater dignity than
the claims of the state. If there is a God, His authority necessarily
transcends the authority of nations; that, in part is what we mean
by "God." For the state to maintain that its authority is in all
matters supreme would be to deny the possibility that a transcendent
authority could exist.
170
McConnell's argument uses language reminiscent of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance, and almost amounts to a presentation of
the "priority claim" of the religious justification. 171 The crucial
difference, as the italicized language makes clear, is that
McConnell's priority claim is not offered affirmatively as something
that the state should positively acknowledge, but rather conditional-
ly as something that might be true and that the liberal state can
neither affirm nor reject. 172 In a sense, therefore, McConnell is
asking the state to adopt an agnostic position toward religion,
17
168 See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15-
24. McConnell offers a number of rationales for affording religion special constitu-
tional treatment, including the rehabilitated religious justification.
169 Id. at 15.
170 Id. (emphasis added).
171 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
172 The conditional character of the argument is retained in a more recent
presentation:
While the government is powerless and incompetent to determine what
particular conception of the divine is authoritative, the free exercise clause
stands as a recognition that such divine authority may exist and, f it exists,
has a rightful claim on the allegiance of believers who happen to be
American citizens.
McConnell, supra note 32, at 1516 (emphasis added).
173 In a more recent article, McConnell himself suggests the appropriateness of
this characterization. Comparing the issues raised by governmental funding of
abortion and of religious education, McConnell observes that Roe v. Wade seems to
require "governmental agnosticism about the morality or immorality of abortion."
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to refrain from embracing either theism or atheism. Nonetheless,
from this position of public agnosticism, McConnell argues for the
conclusion that would follow from a position of public theism: the
state should accommodate citizens' claims when those claims invoke
a divine or transcendent authority. In this way, McConnell's
argument can be understood as an attempt to rehabilitate and
reassert the religious justification without asking the state to accept
any religious beliefs or premises.
174
The stance that McConnell urges upon the state-public
agnosticism-seems compatible with the prohibitory interpretation
of religious freedom. The difficult question, however, is whether a
position of public agnosticism can persuasively justify a conclusion
favoring special constitutional treatment for religion. McConnell
maintains that because religious beliefs might be true, and because
the state cannot pronounce them false, the state must proceed as if
these beliefs are true. But the logic might just as well run the other
way: religious beliefs might be false, and the state cannot pro-
nounce them true; therefore, the state should proceed as if those
beliefs are false.
Upon reflection, the second conclusion seems more plausible,
at least for a genuinely agnostic state. The problem with
McConnell's position is an implicit and dubious allocation of the
burden of persuasion. With regard to the question whether religion
should receive special constitutional treatment, McConnell implicitly
assigns the burden of persuasion to the entity that might deny such
treatment, i.e. the state. If government cannot determine the
truthfulness or validity of religious claims, then the burden has not
been carried and religion receives special treatment. But why
should the burden of persuasion be assigned in this way? Normally,
Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools,
104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 994 (1991). He goes on to suggest that a posture of
governmental agnosticism toward abortion
is for all practical purposes identical to the posture toward religion
prescribed by the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment. The government may not legislate on the presupposition that
religion in general, or any religion in particular, is correct or salutary, nor
on the belief that religion is false or pernicious.
Id. at 995.
174 McConnell does not explicitly state that his argument is being offered for this
purpose, and it is possible that he would simply reject the prohibitory interpretation.
The analysis that follows suggests that the argument is more cogent if understood in
this way, but, of course, it would then be unacceptable to those who embrace the
prohibitory interpretation.
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one would suppose, that burden is properly assigned to the
institution or interest asking for special treatment, not to those who
oppose such treatment. It would be odd for a lobbyist to argue that
the legislature must adopt a particular program unless the pro-
gram's opponents can prove it undesirable. Likewise, plaintiffs in
civil litigation normally would not expect to obtain a judgment
simply by arguing that a remedy would be warranted if their
allegations were true and that the defendants have failed to disprove
those allegations. Why then does McConnell effectively assign the
burden of proof to those who would deny special constitutional
treatment to religion?
McConnell's brief discussion of the issue does not directly
address this question, but answers can be imagined. One possibility
is that the allocation of the burden in favor of special status for
religion is justified because of an antecedent probability: it is more
likely than not that the pertinent religious claims are true, so
although the state cannot definitively pronounce these claims either
true or false, it should act as if they are true. This position seems
sensible if its premise-that the pertinent religious claims are
probably true-is accepted. But that, of course, is the problem; not
only is the premise controversial, it also violates the prohibitory
interpretation of religious freedom. If religious freedom means that
government cannot act on the ground that a religious belief is true,
then government surely cannot circumvent the prohibition merely
by assuming that a religious belief is probably true.
Another possibility is that McConnell's allocation of the burden
of persuasion is warranted on the basis of something like Pascal's
Wager. 175 In Pascal's famous argument, an individual is faced
with an inescapable choice: she must either believe in God or
decline to believe in God. There is no adequate rational proof, the
argument assumes, that can demonstrate the existence or nonexis-
tence of God. Thus, "a coin is being spun which will come down
heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you
choose either, reason cannot prove either wrong."
176
In these circumstances, Pascal contended, the chooser must
consider the stakes-the relative risks and benefits of the alternative
choices. When one looks at the problem in this way, he argued, the
rational choice is to believe in God. If the individual chooses to
175 See BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 149-54 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., 1966).
176 Id. at 150.
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believe, yet it turns out there is no God, she loses very little.1 77
But if her choice is right, she gains eternal salvation. Conversely, if
she chooses not to believe, and in fact there is no God, she gains
very little (beyond the satisfaction of holding a correct belief).
However, if her choice is incorrect the cost is monumental; she loses
her salvation. "This is conclusive and if men are capable of any
truth this is it."
178
McConnell's argument evinces a similar logic. The liberal state
is in the position of Pascal's chooser; it cannot determine whether
there is or is not a transcendent authority. But if such an authority
exists, it would be wrong and unwise in the extreme to flout the
authority's dictates. Hence, when a religious believer presents a
claim invoking divine authority, the state should err on the side of
safety by accommodating the believer's demands.
If this is the basis of McConnell's argument, however, then it is
vulnerable to the same objection that can be made to Pascal's
argument (at least if Pascal is understood as attempting to convince
agnostics to accept religious faith). Antony Flew points out that
Pascal's Wager works only if one assumes that the alternatives he
lists-belief in the Christian God (accompanied by eternal salvation
if the belief is correct) or rejection of such belief (accompanied by
eternal damnation if God does exist)-are the only ones avail-
able. 179 But, he explains:
177 She might lose the benefit of being free to live a kind of life-a hedonistic life,
perhaps-that her belief in God forbids. In Pascal's view, at least, this would be no
great loss. See id. at 153 ("It is true you will not enjoy noxious pleasures, glory and
good living, but will you not have others?... I tell you that you will gain even in this
life . . . ).
17 1 Id. at 152. This description, I should note, may not accurately reflect the real
purpose of Pascal's argument. Read carefully, the argument does not seem intended
to convince someone who is genuinely undecided, or perhaps indifferent, to believe
in God. Rather, the argument seems directed toward someone who may already be
inclined to believe on other grounds such as faith, Scripture, or religious experience
(all of which Pascal alludes to in the course of the argument), but who is hesitating
because of the concern that religious belief is contrary to reason. Pascal seemingly
wants to reassure this person that it is not "sinning against reason" to believe in God.
See id. at 151. He implies that the believer does not base religious faith on reason or
calculation, but if someone insists on evaluating religious faith in those terms, then
it is perfectly rational to hold religious faith. Understood in this way, Pascal's
argument avoids the objection that one cannot simply choose to believe because belief
is not a matter of will or choice. See Alasdair Madntyre, The Debate about God:
Victorian Relevance and Contemporarj Irrelevance, in ALASDAIR MACINTYRE & PAUL
RICOEuR, THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF ATHEIsM 1, 22-23 (1969).
179 See ANTONY FLEW, THE PRESUMPTION OF ATHEIsM 66-68 (1976).
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In thus limiting our betting choices to two, Pascal makes a
gigantic, unwarranted, and false assumption ....
[W]hat we have to recognize, in assessing Pascal's Wager
itself, is that there is no limit to the total of theoretically possible,
mutually exclusive, Hell-threatening cosmic systems. In particular,
for every such system demanding one way of life, and threatening
all others, there is a possible system threatening just that way of
life, and rewarding all others. For every possible way of life, there
are possible systems demanding and penalizing that way of life.
And so on. Catholicism threatens with endless torture all those
outside the true Mystical Body of Christ; but it is just as conceiv-
able that there is a hidden God (Deus absconditus!) who will consign
all and only Catholics to the fate which they so easily approve for
others. Since there is thus an unlimited range of pairs of possible
transcendental religious systems, encouraging and threatening
every conceivable way of life with exactly the same inordinate re-
wards and punishments, such transcendentally backed threats
cannot provide even a prudential reason to choose one way of life
rather than another.
18 0
Flew's disparaging attitude toward Catholicism may be unfair.
Moreover, his argument, based on the mere conceivability of an
infinite variety of cosmic systems, may miss the point for individuals
who believe there is some antecedent probability that certain beliefs
are better candidates for acceptance than others. If the live
choice 181 for me is whether or not to accept Christianity, I am not
likely to be dissuaded by the suggestion that conceivably there is a
deity who will punish only Christians and reward everyone else.
That possibility may indeed be conceivable, but for me there is no
reason to take it seriously.
Despite these deficiencies, Flew's criticism contains a valid point:
Pascal's argument tacitly assumes that particular options in belief
are already regarded as viable or antecedently probable, and that
other possible beliefs, although perhaps conceivable, are not
regarded as viable. Without this assumption, the argument loses its
force.
Similarly, McConnell's argument-the state should respect
religious claims because it cannot pronounce them false-will have
180 Id.
181 For a discussion of the notion of live or genuine choices, see WilliamJames,
The Will to Believe, NEW WORLD, June 1896, at 327, reprinted in WILLiAMJAMES, THE
WRrrINGS OF WILLIAM JAMEs 717-18 (JohnJ. McDermott ed., 1967).
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persuasive force only if we acknowledge an antecedent probability
that the religious beliefs on which those claims depend may be true.
Conversely, if an environmentalist Trekkie claims that concerned
visitors from a wiser planet will wipe out human life unless we
immediately cease all oil drilling and nuclear power production, we
are likely to ignore his claim even though we cannot demonstrate its
falsity. Although these claims are similar in form-each presents a
demand we would want to grant if the underlying premise is true,
and we cannot be certain whether the underlying premise really is
true-it would not be irrational to treat them differently. In this
country, as noted above, religious belief is widespread; belief in
paternalistic Vulcans who want to supervise earthly affairs probably
is not.
In short, if it were permissible to appeal to widely held religious
beliefs, then claims invoking a transcendent authority would at least
enjoy some antecedent probability, and McConnell's argument for
accommodating religion might be cogent. The problem, of course,
is that an appeal to religious beliefs violates the prohibitory
interpretation of religious freedom. Thus, a genuine public
agnosticism does not support special treatment of religion; only a
slanted agnosticism predisposed to credit religious beliefs produces
that result.18 2 In the end, McConnell's argument achieves plausi-
bility only by relying upon tacit assumptions that transgress the
prohibitory interpretation.
C. An Illustrative Case: Jefferson's Statute Revisited
The discussion to this point suggests that although our constitu-
tional commitment to religious liberty was adopted largely on the
basis of a religious justification, our current understanding of what
religious freedom means has rendered thatjustification inadmissible
in constitutional discourse. McConnell's agnosticism rationale, if
understood as an attempt to reformulate the religious justification
in a manner conforming to the prohibitory interpretation, is
unpersuasive. Consequently, our commitment to religious freedom
nullifies its own historical justification.
One way to illustrate this paradox is to apply it to a particular
case. Jefferson's Virginia Act for Religious Freedom provides an
182 In this sense, there is at least a kernel of truth in Stephen Gey's hyperbolic
claim that McConnell's position effects a "transformation of the state from a secular
entity to a sectarian one." Gey, supra note 140, at 142.
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excellent example. This statute has been regarded as a landmark in
the achievement of religious liberty. Martin Marty observes: "For
those who like to speak of an 'Age of Constantine' that began in the
fourth century, there is reason to regard the Virginia act as the key
moment of the end of that age and the beginning of a new
one."1 8 3 The paradoxical quality of our interpretation of religious
freedom is pointedly illustrated by the fact that ifJefferson's statute
were challenged today under prevailing legal doctrine, it would
seemingly be unconstitutional. Even more ironically, the statute
would seemingly be unconstitutional as a violation of religious
freedom.
The substantive section of Jefferson's statute provided:
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested or burdened, in his body or goods,
nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument
to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the
same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge or affect their civil
capacities.1
84
These substantive provisions seem constitutionally unobjectionable.
As noted, however, the stated ground or premise for this enactment
was that "almighty God hath created the mind free" and that any
infringement of this God-given freedom is "a departure from the
plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of
body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on
either, as was in his Almighty power to do .. ."185 Under cur-
rent establishment clause doctrine, Jefferson's statute would be
unconstitutional if it sends a message endorsing religion. Does it?
The question is not entirely rhetorical. The current test is not
whether a message of endorsement would be perceived by real flesh-
and-blood persons, but whether a "reasonable" or "objective"
observer would perceive such a message.18 6 And, as it turns out,
the perceptions of this fictitious observer sometimes differ dramati-
cally from those of actual citizens and scholars.18 7 Still, it is hard
183 Martin E. Marty, The Virginia Statute Two Hundred Years Later, in VIRGINIA
STATUTE, supra note 19, at 1, 2.
184 Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, VA. CODE ANN. § 5'7-1 (Michie 1986),
reprinted in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 19, at xvii.
185 Id. at xvii.
186 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
187 For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-93 (1984) (O'Connor,
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to see how even the most astutely "objective" of observers could fail
to find an endorsement of religion in Jefferson's statute. The
religious language in the preamble appears to be substantive and
justificatory in character; hence, unlike some religious language, it
cannot easily be passed off as serving a merely ceremonious or
solemnizing function.
188
Jefferson's statute can be contrasted in this respect with the
Alabama "moment of silence" law struck down in Wallace v.
Jaffree.189 The statute authorized a moment of silence for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer. Although some Justices indicated that
such a law would be permissible in its substance, 190 the statute
was found to be infirm in large part because the words "voluntary
prayer" were seen as endorsing religion. 191  If the relatively
innocuous language of the Alabama law impermissibly endorsed
religion, then Jefferson's statute positively reeks with offensive
endorsements.
The deeper problem withJefferson's statute, however, is notjust
that its language endorses religion. The objectionable language
might be removed or perhaps ignored, or the "no endorsement" test
might lose favor with thejudiciary. But the essential problem would
remain: if the statute's preamble accurately expressed the reasons
for Virginia's adoption of the statute, then even if the law could be
cleansed of its messages of endorsement it would still offend the
J., concurring), Justice O'Connor concluded that a creche included in a Christmas
display would not send a message endorsing religion. Mark Tushnet points out that
this conclusion "came as a surprise to mostJews." Tushnet, supra note 140, at 712
n.52. Similarly, O'Connor indicated that the motto on coins-"In God We Trust"-
does not communicate a message of endorsement. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93. But
Jesse Choper contends that "[t]he placement of 'In God We Trust' on coins and
currency ... seems to have no real purpose other than a religious one." Jesse H.
Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent
Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943, 947 (1986).
188 Justice O'Connor has argued that many traditional religious symbols and
practices do not endorse religion but instead serve "the legitimate secular purposes
ofsolemnizingpublic occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society." Lynch, 465 U.S at 693
(O'Connor, J., concurring). I have previously argued that this kind of analysis is
based upon a false dichotomy. See Smith, supra note 155, at 281-82, 324.
189 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
19o See id. at 59,62 (Powell,J., concurring); id. at 72-73 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
191 The words "or voluntary prayer" had been added, in the course of a larger
amendment, to an earlier statute authorizing a moment of silence "for meditation."
The majority and Justice O'Connor emphasized the addition of these words in
concluding that the law endorsed religion. See id. at 58-59; id. at 77-78 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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prohibitory interpretation of religious freedom because it would
have been adopted on the basis of religious beliefs.1 92 In fact, it
is likely that the preamble correctly affirms a religious basis for the
statute. After all, the adoption of Jefferson's statute was the
culmination of the debate over the defeated Assessments Bill. And
the resistance to that bill was asserted on pervasively religious
grounds, whether expressed in the biblical language of the Separat-
ist Baptists or in the more Presbyterian terms of natural religion, as
in Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance.1 93 Thus, under either
the "no endorsement" test or the more general prohibitory
interpretation, of which the "no endorsement" test is only one
expression, Jefferson's statute would be difficult to sustain today.
The probable unconstitutionality of this landmark of religious
freedom illustrates the self-canceling quality of our present
constitutional commitment to religious freedom. Even so, one may
view this result as an interesting anomaly, but not a practical
problem. Although Jefferson's statute might be unconstitutional
under current doctrine, a law similar in substance might be
sustained if the preamble were deleted and the religious purpose
replaced by a nonreligious rationale. That possibility raises a crucial
question: is the religious justification indispensable? Is there, in
other words, an adequate nonreligious rationale for giving special
constitutional protection to religious freedom?
IV. CAN THE RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION BE REPLACED?
The foregoing analysis has described the process by which the
constitutional commitment to religious liberty has canceled out its
own historical justification. As suggested, however, that process
might be viewed as manifesting a conceptual curiosity, but not as
posing a realistic threat to the commitment itself. If the religious
justification for religious freedom has been rendered inadmissible,
can we not simply replace it with a currently acceptable nonreligious
rationale? Or, failing that, might we not just rely upon the text of
the First Amendment as a sufficient justification for preserving the
constitutional right to religious freedom?
Although rarely giving sustained attention to the problem of
supplying a contemporary rationale for religious freedom,
194
192 See Dreisbach, supra note 50, at 187-88.
193 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
194 See John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN.
RISE AND FALL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
twentieth-century courts and commentators have offered a variety
of potential nonreligious successors to the religious justification.
The most common of these proposed rationales are the following:
the civic virtue rationale argues that religion deserves special
constitutional protection because it instills in citizens the moral
values or traits of character necessary in a democratic social
order;195 the personal autonomy rationale asserts that religious
freedom is warranted because of the importance of religion to
matters of personal choice and identity;196 the pluralism rationale
emphasizes the importance of religious freedom in ensuring a
diversity of faiths, thereby strengthening American pluralism;
197
the civil strife rationale argues that religious freedom is valuable in
helping to curb the dissension and social conflict that issues of
religion have historically provoked;198 and the nonalienation
rationale suggests that religious freedom helps to avoid offending
citizens who adhere to minority religious faiths or to none at all,
thus helping all citizens to feel like full members of the political
community.
199
These rationales have been subjected to powerful criticisms, and
the following analysis reviews the central ones. The purpose is not
to show that the nonreligious rationales are utterly untenable.
Obviously, some people do find these rationales to be more or less
persuasive. Moreover, some of the rationales were likely influential
during the founding period in securing the commitment to religious
liberty.
200
At that time, however, the nonreligious rationales supplemented
the religious justification. Today, by contrast, they are forced to do
the work of justification on their own. The following analysis
L. REv. 779, 779-82 (1986). According to Michael Smith, "[l]ittle has been written on
the Supreme Court's present-day policy justifications for the special constitutional
place of religion," and the articles written "do not treat the subject systematically."
Smith, supra note 15, at 87.
195 See infra part IV.B.
196 See infra part IV.C.
197 See infra part IV.D.198 See infra part IV.E.
199 See infra part IV.F. There are other possible rationales, along with variations
of the rationales listed. However, those listed appear to be the most common and,
presumptively, the most widely persuasive.
200 See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text (discussing the civil peace
rationale in the founding period); see also CHRIsTOPHER F. MOONEY, PUBLIC VIRTUE:
LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION 24-25 (1986) (discussing the founders'
view that religion was necessary to promote civic virtue).
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suggests that while these rationales cannot be rejected out of hand,
they are probably too weak and vulnerable to sustain a strong
constitutional commitment to religious liberty. This conclusion is
necessarily tentative; there is no precise scale for determining either
how persuasive a constitutional justification needs to be or how
persuasive a particular rationale actually is. However, given the
welter of activities and interests for which special constitutional
protection might be sought, the conferral of special constitutional
status upon a particular interest or activity presumably demands a
comparatively powerful justification. The weighty objections to
which the common nonreligious rationales are liable make it
doubtful that they are capable of meeting this demand.
A. The Requirements of an Adequate Rationale
Although it is impossible to say just how powerful a constitution-
al justification needs to be, one can at least describe the general
characteristics of a rationale adequate to justify special constitution-
al protection for religious freedom. Such a rationale should exhibit
three qualities: distinctiveness, plausibility, and cogency.
The distinctiveness requirement demands that a rationale identify
something distinctive about religion that explains why religion
deserves a level of legal protection that most other human interests
and activities do not receive. 20 1 For example, a rationale which
merely asserts that many citizens care deeply about religion is
plainly inadequate. It may be true that many people care deeply
about religion, but, of course, many people also care passionately
about baseball, or automobiles, or the freedom to pursue a chosen
occupation or profession. The essential question is why religion
deserves a special constitutional protection that these other interests
do not receive.
This distinctiveness requirement should not be made unduly
demanding. It is not necessary that a rationale identify a character-
istic of religion that no other interest or activity shares in any
degree. It should be sufficient to show that religion serves an
important function more effectively or in a more essential way than
201 Free speech theorists have confronted a similar question in trying to explain
why expression deserves special constitutional protection. See, e.g., Lawrence
Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 NW. U. L.
REv. 1319, 1347-49 (1983) (noting that attempts to justify special protection for
speech on the ground that free speech furthers autonomy fail to show why other
autonomy-enhancing activities should not enjoy similar status).
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other interests or activities do; such a showing would serve to
distinguish religion from other candidates for special protection.
For example, a rationale asserting that more people care deeply
about religion than about other things like baseball or business
would seem to satisfy the distinctiveness requirement.
This sort of attempt to distinguish religion, however, might run
afoul of the plausibility requirement. This requirement simply makes
the obvious point that the claims upon which a proposed rationale
depends must be credible. A formally beautiful but factually
unpersuasive rationale is of little help.
Finally, a rationale must meet the cogency requirement. It must
credibly explain not only how religion is distinctive, but how it is
distinctive in a way that calls for a constitutional principle forbid-
ding governmental regulation or interference in matters of religion.
However plausible, a rationale that fails to satisfy the cogency
requirement would amount to nothing more than a compelling non
sequitur.
The following analysis tests the commonly proposed nonreli-
gious rationales against these three requirements, showing that all
encounter serious problems.
B. The Civic Virtue Rationale
The civic virtue rationale contends that religion is essential to
our republic because it helps to inculcate in citizens the moral
character necessary to a democratic society. 20 2  This rationale
202 One version of this rationale suggests that although some people-perhaps
those more enlightened or educated-can live moral lives without the support of
religion, the masses need religion as a foundation for virtue. This idea is suggested
in George Washington's Farewell Address:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion
and morality are indispensable supports .... Whatever may be conceded to the
influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and
experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in
exclusion of religious principle.
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in ADAMs &
EMMERICH, supra note 14, at 114.
In a more philosophical version, it maybe argued that no adequate non-religious
ground for ethics exists. SeeJ.D. Goldsworthy, God orMackie? The Dilemma of Secular
Moral Philosophy, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 43 (1985); Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE LJ. 1229. In one or another version, the civic virtue
rationale is common in modern efforts to justify religious liberty. For examples, see
McConnell, supra note 168, at 16-19; Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 713 (1968); Charles Taylor, Religion in
a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, supra note 26, at 93.
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immediately prompts an objection based on the distinctiveness
requirement. It may be true that religion instills moral character,
but so do schools and families, not to mention a host of other
institutions, such as scouting groups, civic organizations, service
clubs, and athletic leagues. Mark Tushnet remarks: "Religion may
now be one among several methods of inculcating civic virtue,
rather than a necessary method .... ,203 Why then should reli-
gion be singled out for special constitutional treatment?
One response to this objection asserts that religion, although not
the only source of moral character, is nonetheless the most
important source, and perhaps even an indispensable ones, in our
society. 20 4 This contention,' while possibly satisfying the distinc-
tiveness requirement, raises questions of plausibility. Some critics
doubt that religion is an essential source of moral character.
20 5
Indeed, some argue that religion tends to produce authoritarian
character traits that are incompatible with the ethos of a democratic
society. Stephen Gey insists that "the very structure of religious
ideas and practice are contrary to the mode of thought necessary to
foster democratic self-governance" and that "the authoritarian and
203 Mark V. Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion
(Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1696 (1988); see also William P. Marshall, The Case
Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
357, 380-82 (1989-90) (stating that "religion does not lay claim to a monopoly in the
inculcation of civic virtues").
204 See REICHLEY, supra note 89, at 341-50.
205 Based on survey research studying religiosity amongAmericans and correlating
such religiosity with behavior "related to lying, cheating, pilferage, and non-reporting
of theft," George Gallup, Jr. reported in 1984 that "little difference is found in the
ethical views and behavior of the unchurched and the churched." THE GALLuP
REPORT, REPORT No. 222, RELIGION IN AMERICA 19 (1984). With respect to the more
philosophical claim that no intellectually adequate ethics can be developed without
incorporating religious premises, see supra note 202, one commentator argues:
We know that God and the action of God are not needed as logical
underpinning of any coherent morality or fundamental law. Whether we
followJ. S. Mill in deriving a perfectly adequate and humane morality from
the simple fact that people attempt to obtain happiness, Immanuel Kant in
pegging the working out of morality from the simple imperative to be
moral, or H. L. A. Hart in deriving a perfectly usable fundamental "natural
law" from the mere attempt to survive in human bodies with human needs,
we can deduce most of the morality that religion has taught from very
simple observations.... We need no "Dominus dixit" to back up our funda-
mental moral convictions.
Lisa Newton, Divine Sanction and Legal Authority: Religion and the Infrastructure of the
Law, in RELIGION, MORALrY, AND THE LAW: NOMOs XXX 179, 179 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
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undemocratic nature of religion is inconsistent with the anti-
authoritarian and democratic biases of the Constitution."
20 6
Even if the civic virtue rationale can fulfill the distinctiveness
and plausibility requirements, it remains seriously vulnerable,
however, to the requirement of cogency. Suppose we assume that
religion is an especially important factor in shaping moral character.
Why does it follow that religion should be insulated against
governmental regulation? One might credibly argue that exactly the
opposite conclusion is warranted-that state supervision is appropri-
ate precisely because character formation is such a vital social
function. In other contexts, at least, this would be the natural
conclusion. Thus, the importance of character formation is usually
taken as an argument for rather than against maintaining state-
sponsored and state-regulated schools. 20 7 It is also viewed as a
reason supporting public supervision of student expression.
208
The same reasoning can, and sometimes does, support state
interference with religious institutions that are viewed as inculcating
moral values of which society does not approve. 20 9 Hence, even
206 Gey, supra note 140, at 178, 184; see also Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism
and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 387 (1991) (suggesting that religion need not
but is likely to produce authoritarianism). See generally Gey, supra note 140, at 172-86.
Gallup's research contradicted the view that religious faith produces authoritarianism,
suggesting that persons who are "highly spiritually committed" also "tend to be more
tolerant of persons of different races and religions than are those who are less
spiritually committed." THE GALLUP REPORT, supra note 205, at 18.
207 See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (recognizing the
"importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.... It is the
very foundation of good citizenship.").
208 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 270-73 (1988)
(stating that schools may restrain student expression in order to promote cultural
values and prepare students for later professional training). In Bethel School District
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the Supreme Court declared that "'[p]ublic education
must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic.... It must inculcate the habits
and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government.... .'" Id. at 681 (quoting CHARLES
A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASic HIsToRY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
From this premise the Court concluded that the Constitution permits students' rights
to free expression to be balanced against "society's countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." Id.
209 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619
(1986) (permitting state agency to proceed against Christian schools in connection
with alleged civil rights violations); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (upholding withdrawal of tax exempt status from religious schools because of
school policies forbidding interracial dating).
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if religion has a uniquely important role in instilling moral values,
it need not follow that religion should receive special constitutional
protection against state interference.
2 10
C. The Personal Autonomy Rationale
The personal autonomy rationale contends that religious belief
and practice are important to a person's sense of who she is and
what kind of person she wants to be; the freedom to be oneself
entails the freedom to hold religious beliefs and to act in accor-
dance with those beliefs.21 ' The objections to this rationale and
the responses to those objections follow a familiar course. The
initial criticism is that the personal autonomy rationale fails the
distinctiveness test. Religious beliefs and practices may be impor-
tant to personal identity, but of course many other aspects of belief,
choice, heritage, lifestyle, and personality are also vital to a person's
sense of who she is.
2 12
210 Indeed, William Marshall goes further, arguing that to grant religion special
treatment over other institutions and belief systems that may influence character
formation is to indulge in an unconstitutional favoritism. See Marshall, supra note
203, at 388-412. "By preferring religious belief systems over all others, including
philosophical, moral, and political belief systems, [a religious] exemption [from
regulation] offends the equality-of-ideas notion that is at the core of constitutional
law." Id. at 411-12.
211 Ira Lupu explains: "Rights of free exercise are quintessentially rights of
autonomy. The right of religious liberty embraced in the clause protects interests in
making and maintaining spiritual commitments, and in living in accord with one's
deepest presuppositions about humankind and nature." Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 391, 422 (1987); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and
Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the
Constitution, 51 OHIO. ST. L.J. 89, 95 (1990) ("[T]he free exercise of religion.., is
part of that basic autonomy of identity and self-creation which we preserve from state
manipulation, not because of its utility to social organization, but because of its
importance to the human condition."). Michael Sandel argues that this rationale for
religious freedom is pervasive in liberal constitutional thinking. See Sandel, supra note
143, at 84-86. "By emphasizing the individual's right to choose his beliefs, [this
rationale] points beyond religion to 'the broader perspective' of autonomy rights in
general, including 'the rights of privacy and personhood.'" Id. at 87 (quoting
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw 885 (Ist ed. 1978)).
212 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and
Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 361 n.56 (1991) (asserting that "the
protection of matters essential to self-identity does not categorically distinguish
religious from moral, philosophical, or political sensibilities. Religious beliefs are not
the only types of beliefs that may be critical to one's self-identity."). In a similar
analysis, referring to Simcha Goldman's religious duty to wear a yarmulke, John
Garvey observes:
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A proponent of this rationale might rejoin by asserting that
although a variety of factors impinge upon or help to constitute
personal identity, religion is the most essential factor.213  In
satisfying the distinctiveness requirement, however, this claim of
centrality creates plausibility problems.214 Religious belief may be
the most vital element in some persons' identities, yet it is doubtful
this is true for all, or even most, individuals. A religious term
(Christian, Jew, agnostic) may be no more important to a person's
conception of who she is than other terms based on such diverse
factors as personal relationships (mother, sister), profession
(engineer, lawyer), race (Hispanic, Native American), political
affiliation (Republican, Libertarian), special skills (violinist,
gardener), socioeconomic status (yuppie, homeless), residence (New
Yorker, Westerner), or individual habits, tastes, activities, interests,
or loyalties (vegetarian, Cubs fan). 215 If individuals could accu-
rately rank such terms in order of importance to their identity, it is
doubtful that the religious term would uniformly occupy first place.
There are quite likely as many (Christian) yuppies as (yuppie)
Christians.
216
I might truthfully say that wearing a cowboy hat is important not just for my
image, but to my very conception of self. If my claim were sincere,
Goldman and I ought to get the same degree of protection for our
autonomous choices. But Goldman's claim is constitutionally stronger, for
a reason that goes beyond autonomy to some special value of religion.
Garvey, supra note 194, at 791.
213 Alan Brownstein notes "the unique nature of religious affiliation with regard
to its impact on a person's sense of identity. Religion is a core part of one's sense of
self. Other mutable attributes, such as political affiliation, are generally viewed as
more tangential and ephemeral." Brownstein, supra note 211, at 147; see also Daniel
0. Conkle, Toward a General Theoty of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV.
1113, 1164-66 (1988) (claiming that an individual's acceptance of religious beliefs or
self-conscious rejection of religious beliefs forces the individual to confront questions
of who one is and what one's place in the world is, and thereby forms a necessary
part of self-definition); Feigenson, supra note 152, at 74 (stating that religious
identification is "often primary in adherents' conceptions of themselves and others").
214 Cf Smith, supra note 15, at 93-94 (questioning whether freedom of religion is
more important to human personality than other things such as freedom of
occupation).
2 5 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Cm. L. REV. 308, 320-21 (1991) ("[R]eligious belief cannot be qualitatively distin-
guished from other belief systems in a way that justifies special constitutional
consideration. For example, bonds of ethnicity, interpersonal relationships, and social
and political relationships as well as religion may be, and are, integral to an
individual's self-identity." (footnotes omitted)).
216 George Gallup reports: "The vast majority of us say that religion is important
in our lives but few say it is the most important influence in their lives .... Americans
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Finally, even if religion is the most central element in personal
identity, it may not provide a cogent justification for a special
constitutional commitment to religious liberty. Personal autonomy
concerns are already the subject of constitutional rights protecting
freedoms of speech, belief, and association. These freedoms are not
directed toward religious faith in particular, and their scope is not
coextensive with that of rights to religious freedom as traditionally
understood.2 1 7 But insofar as religious freedom is understood
merely as a manifestation of the concern for personal autonomy, it
is arguable that the freedoms of speech and belief already provide
sufficient protection. In this vein, William Marshall calls for
collapsing free exercise doctrine into free speech doctrine, 2 18 and
Ira Lupu argues that institutional free exercise claims ought to be
treated as an aspect of freedom of association. 219 These analyses
suggest that when religious freedom is rationalized as a way to
protect personal autonomy, the natural outcome is that religious
freedom loses its claim to special or independent constitutional
status.
D. The Pluralism Rationale
From the beginning of the republic, pluralism has been regarded
as an important value in our democratic society. Pluralism may be
embraced for its instrumental value in preventing tyranny and
restraining factionalism 220 or celebrated as desirable in itself.
221
In any event, religious freedom is sometimes justified on the ground
that it promotes American pluralism.
22 2
say that religion is important, but they rank health, family, love and friends all ahead
of religion." THE GALLUP REPORT, supra note 205, at 9.
217 Rodney Smith points out that "while the protection of religious speech or
expression is an element of religious liberty, it is both over- and under-inclusive as a
doctrinal matter." Rodney K. Smith, Establishment Clause Analysis: A Liberty
MaximizingProposal, 4 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHIcS & PUB. POL'Y 463,483 (1990); see also
Marshall, supra note 203, at 361 (observing that "many claims currently recognized
as implicating free exercise protection do not easily fit within a [free] speech
analysis").
211 See Marshall, supra note 10.
219 See Lupu, supra note 211, at 431-43.
220 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
221 Judith Shklar has proposed"a defense of social diversity" which maintains that
"a diversity of opinions and habits is not only to be endured but to be cherished and
encouraged .... The range and the number of choices available and the mutual
tolerance among those who choose conflicting paths are what determine the degree
of freedom that the members of any modern society can be said to enjoy." JUDITH
SHKLAR, LEGALISM 5-6 (1964).
222 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
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From the outset this justification confronts a dilemma: in its
most plausible version, the pluralism rationale does not satisfy the
distinctiveness requirement, while in its more distinctive version the
rationale is of doubtful plausibility. If the rationale merely asserts
that religious diversity increases the degree of overall pluralism,
then the rationale seems plausible, and, indeed, true by definition.
But in this sense diversity in any sphere, whether intellectual, ethnic,
cultural, economic, or recreational, will make society more pluralis-
tic. Understood in this way, the pluralism rationale fails to explain
why religion should be the subject of special constitutional protec-
tion. 223 Conversely, if the rationale contends that religious diversi-
ty contributes to American pluralism in a more essential or valuable
manner than diversity in other spheres of human life, problems of
plausibility arise. Why is religious diversity uniquely valuable?
Some scholars suggest that religious pluralism provides the best
practical assurance of religious freedom. 224 This contention may
be correct, but it is not responsive to (and is probably not intended
to be responsive to) the present question. By assuming the
importance of religious freedom, this rationale begs the question
presently at issue. 225  Conversely, if the claim is that religious
diversity is more important than other kinds of diversity in resisting
tyranny or political oppression generally, the claim is more dubious.
One might support that claim by arguing that religion threatens
democracy by cultivating authoritarian qualities in the citizenry
226
and that religious pluralism reduces this threat by weakening the
overall force of religion in society. 227 But even accepting the first
concurring) (stating that religion "uniquely contribute[s] to the pluralism of American
society");J. Morris Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying the Constitutional Law
of Religious Freedom, 64 MINN. L. REv. 453, 460 (1980) (arguing that allowing
individuals to "do their own thing" in the religious context helps achieve pluralism
in society); Stephen V. Monsma, The Neutrality Principle and a Pluralist Concept of
Accommodation, in EQUAL SEPARATION, supra note 14, at 73, 84-90 (noting that
separation of church and state "gives churches and other religious groups their
proper due" which is critical to the achievement of a pluralistic society).
See Marshall, supra note 203, at 381 ("The problem with the pluralism theory
is ... that it is not an argument for special protection for religious exercise. The
values inherent in pluralism are also advanced by the protection of non-religious
groups.").
24 See Bradley, supra note 55, at 735-36, 740-47.
225 This does not mean, of course, that arguments linking religious pluralism to
religious liberty are analytically flawed, but only that they do not address the question
being considered here.
A See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
227 Robert Baird, the nineteenth-century church historian, attributed a design of
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premise of this argument, the notion that religious pluralism
weakens religion is highly questionable. 228  Alternatively, one
might support the claim by arguing that a religious faction is more
likely than political, economic, social, or ideological factions to
attempt to seize control of government, and that religious pluralism
is the best way to counter the threat of domination. Again,
however, even if the premise of this argument is plausible, the
argument at best supports a nonestablishment policy,229 not a
general commitment to special constitutional protection which
permits religion to flourish. In fact, on this view religion can be
seen as an evil to be endured, rather than an activity to be encour-
aged through constitutional protection.
230
The pluralism rationale encounters a further problem, which can
be regarded as one either of plausibility or of cogency. Pluralism,
despite its central role in much democratic theory, is hardly an
unmitigated good. The benefit of pluralism is that it helps to avoid
political tyranny; the cost is potentially impeding the realization of
genuine political community. This possibility emerges unmistakably
from Alasdair MacIntyre's modern classic After Virtue. MacIntyre
shows how as older moral and religious traditions broke down,
debates about issues such as the justness of war, the permissibility
of abortion, and the tension between liberty and economic equality
became what they are today: a chaos of conflicting and incommen-
surable assertions. 231  In this context MacIntyre argues that
this sort to Thomas Jefferson. In Baird's view,Jefferson was "a very bitter enemy to
Christianity, and we may even assume that he wished to see not only the Episcopal
church separated from the state in Virginia, but the utter overthrow of everything in
the shape of a church throughout the country." ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 230 (Arno Press 1969) (1844). With respect tojefferson's
Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, Baird opined that "it gave its author great
satisfaction, not because it embodied the principles of eternaljustice, but because by
putting all religious sects on an equality, it seemed to degrade Christianity .... It
was this that made the arch-infidel chuckle with satisfaction-not, we repeat, that the
great principles embodied in the measure were right." Id. at 241.
228 See, e.g., Murrin, supra note 26, at 25 (asserting that religious pluralism has
strengthened religion in the United States).
229 Even this conclusion is suspect. If one is truly worried about religion seizing
control of government, perhaps the best preventive measure is for government to
establish, operate, and supervise an official state church. This policy, of course, might
provoke civil strife; at this point, the pluralism rationale overlaps with the civil strife
rationale considered infra part IV.E.
230 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 15, at 112 (describing the view of Felix Frankfurter
and Alexander Bickel that religion is a "public nuisance" that we are "bound to
suffer" but should strive to replace).
231 See MACINTYRE, supra note 135, at 6-7.
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genuine political community is impossible, 23 2 and that politics,
losing the dignity it enjoyed in classical thought, becomes a form of
"civil war carried on by other means." 233 MacIntyre's diagnosis
is controversial, of course, but that is just the point. His analysis
demonstrates the vulnerability of a rationale that would justify
religious freedom on the supposition that pluralism is an uncon-
troversial good.
E. The Civil Stife Rationale
The essence of the civil strife rationale suggests that religious
freedom is important in preventing conflict over religious is-
sues.2 34 Analysis of this rationale follows a recurrent pattern.
The first objection is that religion is only one of a number of
sources of civil strife; hence, the rationale fails to identify a
distinguishing feature of religion that explains why religion requires
special constitutional protection.2 35 The response to this objec-
tion asserts that while religion is not the only source of social
conflict, it is a distinctively potent source of serious dissension.
And the rejoinder insists that, at least in the context of our history,
this claim is simply implausible. Michael Smith argues:
Our most divisive social issues since the constitutional revolution
of 1937 have included the completion of industrial unionization in
the late 1930s; McGarthyism in the early 1950s; the campaign for
racial equality from the middle 1950s onward; prolongation of the
Vietnam War; and perhaps the Watergate scandal. It is perhaps
too early to tell whether abortion and other sexual issues ...
232 See id. at 244.
233 Id. at 253.
234 Michael Smith observes that this is probably the most commonly offered
justification for religious freedom in modern constitutional discourse. See Smith,
supra note 15, at 96.
235 Alan Schwarz made the point years ago, arguing with respect to the civil strife
rationale that,
[t]o state this proposition is to ridicule it. If avoidance of strife were an
independent constitutional value, no legislation could be adopted on any
subject which aroused strong and divided feelings. Nor could a constitu-
tional doctrine of strife avoidance be limited in application to legislation
which exacerbates religious differences on the ground that those differences
are more upsetting than any others. Patently, racial differences are today
a far greater cause of strife than differences in religious belief. Would,
then, the possibility of exacerbated racial controversy in and of itself
invalidate open housing legislation?
Schwarz, supra note 202, at 711.
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should be added to this list. Even if so, they would be the only
ones inherently involving religion03
6
One answer to this analysis might be that even if religion has not
in fact been a distinctively divisive force in our society, the reason
for this comparative tranquility is precisely that we have defused
religion's divisive potential by giving constitutional protection to
religious liberty. 237 And if protection were abandoned, religion
might become an explosive force in our society, just as it was in
seventeenth-century England 238 and as it is today in Ireland and
India. This claim is inherently speculative, of course, and to the
extent our history sheds light on it, the claim is dubious. The
guarantees of religious liberty contained in the United States
Constitution were not understood to apply to the states until the
1940s.239  During the first century-and-a-half of our republic,
states were free to establish an official church, exclude religious
dissenters from office, or otherwise engage in religious persecution.
Nonetheless, no state maintained an established church after the
1830s.240 And although religious exclusion and persecution were
hardly unknown, 24 1 it is fair to say that issues directly implicating
236 Smith, supra note 15, at 97; see also Michael W. McConnell, Political and
Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 405,413 ("Religious differences in this
country have never generated the civil discord experienced in political conflicts over
such issues as the Vietnam War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or
slavery.").
The rejoinder can also be stated in psychological terms:
It is not obvious why people should be supposed to be more contentious
about their beliefs when they are rooted in some traditional religion than
when they are rooted in a secular outlook. Indeed, the assumption that
seems to underlie such a claim is [that] . . . secular views [are] . .. less
capable than religious ones ofgenerating loyalty or commitment. I see little
reason to agree with such a view. Much in human experience indicates that
it is false.
Strike, supra note 132, at 487.
237 See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Disdain for the Lessons of History: Comments on Love
and Power, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 159, 181-82 (1991).2 18 But see infra note 287.
239 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
240 Massachusetts was the last state to accept disestablishment, doing so in 1833.
See ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 76-
78 (1964).
241 See, e.g., EDWIN B. FIRMAGE & RICHARD C. MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS 49-
260 (1988) (discussing nineteenth-century persecution of Mormons); EDWIN S.
GAUSTAD, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF AMERICA 208-17 (1966) (describing nineteenth-
century persecution of Catholics and Jews).
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religion were not as socially divisive as controversies about matters
such as slavery and unionization.
In a broader sense, of course, many of our most controversial
issues have implicated religious beliefs; slavery is an obvious
example.242 This observation, however, generates another objec-
tion to the civil strife rationale: even if plausible, the rationale does
not appear cogent. Let us assume that religious disagreements are
especially disruptive to civil peace. Does it follow that a constitu-
tional commitment to religious freedom will prevent or reduce such
disruption? The question does not seem susceptible to a uniform
answer that can be usefully embodied in constitutional doctrine
because the effect of such a commitment will likely depend both on
the nature of the particular religious disagreement and on the way
in which religious freedom is understood.
For example, if in a religiously pluralistic community the issue
is whether a particular denomination should enjoy monopoly status
as the community's official religion, then one might plausibly
conclude that a policy of nonestablishment, not necessarily entailing
any more general commitment to religious liberty, would likely
reduce the conflict that the struggle to achieve exclusive recognition
might generate. Conversely, suppose the issue is whether students
should pray aloud in public schools, and that a large majority of
citizens favor the practice. 243  Under these circumstances, a
decision declaring the practice inconsistent with religious freedom
may provoke more dissension than it quells.244  Finally, with
respect to issues such as slavery or abortion where religious views
are likely to be a source of tension, it is not clear that any interpre-
tation of constitutional religious freedom could reduce the tension.
Whatever stance the state may take toward religion, the disagree-
ment is likely to persist. Thus, even if religion is a distinctively
2 42 
See 2 SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
101-14 (1975).
243 In 1963,70% ofAmericans disapproved of the Supreme Court's school prayer
rulings. Over twenty years later, in 1984, 64% of the population continued to favor
a constitutional amendment permitting organized school prayer. See Joseph B.
Tamney & Stephen D.Johnson, Church-State Relations in the Eighties: Public Opinion
in Middletown, 48 SOC. ANALYSIS 1, 5 (1987).
244 See Sandel, supra note 143, at 86-87. Sandel cites the school prayer decisions
as cases in which the implementation of religious freedom provoked more strife than
it prevented; others have agreed. See John S. Baker, Jr., The Religion Clauses
Reconsidered: TheJaffree Case, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 125, 139 (1984); see also LEO PFEFFER,
RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 82-86 (1984) (describing the outrage
generated by school prayer decisions).
1991]
210 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:149
potent source of social strife, a policy of constitutional religious
freedom is not necessarily an efficacious response to that dan-
ger.
245
F. The Nonalienation Rationale
In comparison to the justifications previously discussed, the
nonalienation rationale is of relatively recent vintage; it has been
developed over the last decade in connection with the interpretation
of the Establishment Clause as a prohibition against governmental
messages that endorse or disapprove of religion. 24 6 The nonalien-
ation rationale can be viewed as an effort to avoid the failings of the
rationales discussed above, and in particular those of the civil strife
rationale. It may be implausible to rationalize decisions forbidding,
for example, a municipal nativity scene or a "moment of silence"
provision on the ground that these practices are likely to provoke
civil strife which "strain[s] a political system to the breaking
point."24 7 But it seems eminently plausible to assert that govern-
ment involvement in or endorsement of religion may alienate or
offend some citizens. Thus, the nonalienation rationale closely
parallels the civil strife rationale, except that the feared evil has
been scaled down. Where the older rationale suggested a danger of
serious social disruption leading perhaps to political disintegration,
the newer rationale envisions, at least in the short term, a more
quiet withdrawal of some citizens from the political community
because of their sense of second-class status.
248
245 Cf Schwarz, supra note 202, at 711 (arguing that "prohibiting aid to religion
does not avoid strife, it merely alters its source"); see also Michael A. Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311,347 (1986) ("The invalidation of a 'divisive'
policy because of its supposed 'divisiveness' can be the most 'divisive' action of all."
(footnote omitted)).
246 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the appearance of a government stance on religion);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing
that government must not communicate a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion).47 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
248 For characteristic expressions of this rationale, see County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S.
at 595-97; id. at 625-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING
TO AMERICA 100-04 (1989); TRIBE, supra note 14, §§ 14-15, at 1293-97; Feigenson,
supra note 152, at 55. By diluting the projected evil, the newer rationale raises a
question whether this evil is sufficient to justify a special constitutional right, even
assuming other objections to the nonalienation rationale are overcome. Traditionally,
the Constitution has not been understood to prohibit governmental actions that give
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Since the nonalienation rationale parallels the civil strife
rationale, one would expect it to generate similar objections and
responses, and it does. The first objection 'is that although
governmental involvement in or endorsement of religion may
alienate or offend some citizens, government involvement in any
area of life or endorsement of any belief may have the same
consequence. Government endorses free enterprise but not
socialism, war against Iraq rather than continuation of nonmilitary
sanctions or pacifism, policies of natural resource development over
certain kinds of environmentalist policies. The public schools, at
the insistence of the Supreme Court, sponsor the teaching of
evolution but not of creationism. 249 Any of these actions and
messages may offend some citizens and cause them to feel like
"outsiders." Thus, the simple fact that governmental endorsement
of religion produces offense is not sufficient to make religion
distinctive.
250
Proponents of the rationale may argue that the offense and
sense of exclusion arising from religious messages is more severe
than that based on other kinds of governmental messages.
251
Once again, this answer responds to the distinctiveness concern, but
only at the cost of raising significant plausibility questions. Is it
clear that citizens who are communists, pacifists, or fervent
environmentalists feel less alienated than citizens who object to
public displays containing menorahs or nativity scenes?
Even more importantly, the nonalienation rationale encounters
serious difficulties with the cogency requirement. As with the civil
strife rationale, the concern to avoid alienation does not appear to
generate general principles that can be usefully embodied in
constitutional law. Even though there may be a connection between
religious freedom and the good or value of nonalienation, that
connection is not necessary or uniform, but rather contingent on
shifting and elusive cultural circumstances. Consequently, the
offense; indeed, even if government is violating the Constitution in a substantive way,
citizens who merely claim they are offended by the action have not been regarded as
having suffered a sufficient injury to claim standing to challenge the violation. See
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
249 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968).
250 See Marshall, supra note 212, at 358-63.
251 See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 213, at 1168 (noting that "the existing bonds of
community can be severely weakened" by government endorsement of a religious
belief).
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nonalienation rationale, while identifying a sensible desideratum for
wise political policy, provides an infirm foundation for a general
and judicially enforceable constitutional commitment.
This point can be clarified by imagining a hypothetical political
community in which devotees of one religion, the "Baal-worship-
pers," constitute ninety percent of the population; the other ten
percent are "Diana-worshippers." The Baal-worshippers tolerate the
religion of Diana in the limited sense that they have not made it a
criminal offense to practice that religion. But they believe that
Diana worship is evil and offensive, and that they would be
contaminated by close contact with the disciples of Diana. Or
perhaps they believe that Baal would frown on any government that
afforded infidels equal political status with his own disciples.
Consequently, the community's constitution excludes Diana-
worshippers from serving in public office. The constitution is
similar in this respect to those of many American states before and
for decades after the adoption of the First Amendment that used
religious oath requirements or other restrictions to exclude non-
theists, non-Christians, or sometimes non-Protestants from public
office.
252
In this situation, will the adoption of a commitment to religious
freedom reduce alienation by removing the barrier that excludes
Diana-worshippers from office? Certainly such a commitment
would help to assuage the severe sense of alienation experienced by
Diana-worshippers. But if the result of admitting the Diana-
worshippers to equal status is that Baal-worshippers, fearing
spiritual contamination, feel compelled to withdraw from public
office, then the overall degree of alienation-the sense of exclusion
from public life on religious grounds-might well increase. Of
course, one might still argue that religious freedom is the correct or
just policy. If Baal-worshippers feel alienated, one might contend,
it is their own fault for believing the way they do.2 53  Or one
might excuse the alienation of Baal-worshippers by frankly asserting
that theirs is a pernicious or unworthy faith. But one could hardly
rely upon the desirability of reducing actual alienation as the
252 
See CHESTERJ. ANTIEAU ET AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
102-04 (1965).
253 Of course, the Baal-worshippers could have said the same thing all along to the
Diana-worshippers. The statement is formally correct in both cases; indeed, it will
always be formally correct to say that those who feel alienated on religious grounds
would not feel so if they did not believe as they do.
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justification for this position because in this context religious
freedom would likely increase overall alienation.
Under other circumstances, religious freedom would reduce
overall alienation. If the percentage of Diana-worshippers increases,
or if numerous Baal-worshippers abandon the belief that association
with Diana-worshippers leads to spiritual contamination, then the
balance might shift in favor of religious freedom. Likewise, in our
society there are certain aspects of religious freedom that undoubt-
edly produce a clear net gain in political inclusion. For example,
one could confidently suppose that the absence of an established
church forestalls more alienation than it produces, even though a
few citizens favoring an established church may feel alienated by
nonestablishment. 254 On many other issues, however, including
school prayer, 255 aid to parochial schools, and religious symbols
in public displays, the balance of alienation is much harder to
assess.
256
The problem is particularly complex because there is no
assurance that the balance of alienation with respect to a given issue
will be uniform through space and time. In a largely secular
community, or a politically and religiously liberal community, a
"Balanced-Treatment" statute requiring that creationism receive
equal attention with evolution in the public school curriculum might
produce more disaffection than it would relieve.257  Hardly
anyone in this community, we may suppose, is alienated by the
teaching of evolution anyway; but many students and their parents
254 See Ladd, supra note 82, at 28 (explaining that survey evidence shows that the
essential notion of separation of church and state is "universally accepted" by
Americans).
255 See supra note 243.
256 One scholar notices:
[T]his problem of "at homeness" and alienation is inherently insoluble. Like
it or not, the nature of governmental action is to take stands which some
citizens will reject due to their religious scruples.... For example, non-
Christians are rankled by public nativity scenes. Very well. But who is more
rankled by public schools these days than Catholics and fundamentalist
Christians? Jews and fundamentalist Christians generally applaud American
support of Israel. How do most Muslims feel about that? Jews and non-
Catholic Christians until very recently have railed against parochial school
aid; Catholics, of course, saw either Protestarian or secular humanism
endorsed in public schools. Everyone but Catholics sued Ronald Reagan for
his diplomatic recognition of the Vatican. And so on.
Bradley, supra note 55, at 732-33 (footnotes omitted).
257 The Supreme Court invalidated such a statute in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987).
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likely would be offended by the teaching of what they regard as
fundamentalist religion masquerading as science. Conversely, in a
community composed largely of religious conservatives, a "Balanced-
Treatment" statute would have the opposite effect: it may alleviate
the considerable alienation generated by the exclusive teaching of
evolution.
258
Just as the relative offensiveness of particular messages for
different groups might vary from community to community, it might
also change over time. The scholarly treatment of publicly spon-
sored nativity scenes illustrates this possibility. In 1964, Professor
Wilber Katz suggested that such displays were in principle unconsti-
tutional but might be excused under a de minimis rationale. "If this
means that our neutrality is a bit more neutral toward some than
toward others," Katz observed, "a sense of humor should enable all
of us to accept the situation ... ."259 By contrast, two decades
later when the Court approved a nativity display in Lynch v.
Donnelly,260 legal scholars were incensed.2 61  Leo Pfeffer went
so far as to compare Lynch to the Dred Scott decision.
262
These drastically different reactions were no doubt influenced
in part by expectations arising from two decades of evolution in
constitutional doctrine. This observation reflects a further difficulty
in embodying an effective nonalienation policy in constitutional law:
even if an adopted constitutional principle or doctrine were initially
accurate in estimating the balance of alienation, the doctrine itself
would likely alter the cultural dynamic in which that balance is
258 Cf Conkle, supra note 213, at 1174 n.238 (noting that "[t]he teaching of
evolution in the public schools... deeply offends the religious beliefs of some").
259 WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTUTIONs 23-24 (1964).
260 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
261 See Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious
Neutrality, 45 MD. L. REv. 352,353 (1986) (Lynch was "devastating to first amendment
doctrine"); Janet L. Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a National
'Religion,' 39 MERCER L. REV. 495, 502 (1988) (Lynch is comparable to Pessy v.
Ferguson); Norman Dorsen, The United States Supreme Court: Trends and Prospects, 21
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 22 (1986) (Lynch "marked the greatest incursion to date
on the separation of church and state"); Philip B. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and
the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1984) (Lynch was "disingenuous" and
"sleazy"); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of
Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1986) (Lynch was "wholly
unprincipled and indefensible"); William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court:
Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Walt-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770,
781 (Lynch showed "a paradigmatic disregard of the establishment clause in virtually
every dimension of its concerns").
262 See PFEFFER, supra note 244, at 124.
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grounded. Indeed, a doctrine purporting to forbid all governmental
endorsement or disapproval of religion may give rise to a revolution
of rising expectations, so that people become more sensitive to, and
alienated by, what they formerly took for granted.263
Proliferating litigation in recent years over public religious
symbols is perhaps an instance of this type of revolution,264 and
there is no reason to assume the escalation is finished. Scholars
have suggested, plausibly enough, that the "no endorsement"
interpretation of religious freedom ought logically to invalidate
numerous practices that the Supreme Court has not been forced to
rule upon, including, for example, the names of cities like Corpus
Christi and Los Angeles.265 It would hardly be surprising if these
suggestions lead to further litigation and, inevitably, to further
disappointment, frustration, and alienation on the part of one
group or another.
Faced with this complexity, an advocate of the nonalienation
rationale might be tempted to simplify the problem by focusing on
one side of the alienation balance while ignoring the other. In this
way, she might create the appearance of a necessary or uniform
relationship-a relationship not closely dependent on cultural
context-between political inclusiveness and a version of religious
freedom. In essence, the Supreme Court has done this when
applying its "no endorsement" interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. 266  Its decisions exhibit a very simple logic: religious
263 Cf Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 831 (1984) ("[B]y encouraging persons who are easily
offended by religious symbolism to believe that the courts stand open to remedy their
complaints, the courts foster divisive conflicts over religion.").
26 William Marshall, a supporter of the "no endorsement" interpretation, laments
this pattern of escalation (although it does not lead him to doubt the wisdom of the
"no endorsement" test):
An unfortunate pattern of litigation has engulfed the religion clause debate.
Divergent and often opposing groups seem intent on prohibiting what they
deem offensive and have selected the religion clauses as their weapon of
choice. Lawsuits attacking"humanist" textbooks, Christmas carols, football
game invocations, graduation convocations, nativity scenes and the National
Endowment for the Arts are just a few of the lawsuits that have been
brought by credible organizations.
Marshall, supra note 212, at 375-76.
265 See Laycock, supra note 261, at 8; Feigenson, supra note 152, at 98 n.210.
Feigenson also argues that the display of religious art in public galleries raises major
constitutional issues. See id. at 109-10.
266 Although the Justices have acknowledged that context is important in
determining whether a symbol sends a religious message, see County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (1989) (O'ConnorJ., concurring), the Court automatically
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symbols or messages emanating from government alienate some
citizens; therefore, eliminating such symbols and messages will
reduce alienation. The Court simply takes no account of the other
side of the balance-the alienation that many persons feel toward a
government they perceive as indifferent or hostile to religion, and
that is likely to be aggravated by the results of the "no endorse-
ment" version of religious freedom. 267 This one-sided approach
makes it impossible for the Court to assess whether its decisions do
anything to reduce overall alienation, just as it would be impossible
for a business to determine whether it made a profit if its accoun-
tants reported only gross revenues while refusing to acknowledge
expenses.
Commentators who support the Court's general approach in this
area are often more astute, or at least more candid, in recognizing
its limitations. Although they acknowledge that any governmental
action is likely to produce alienation in some citizens while reducing
alienation in others, these scholars, nonetheless, favor a constitu-
tional interpretation requiring government to act in the way that
will minimize political alienation. 268 Unfortunately, these scholars
offer no practical way to measure net alienation. They may propose
simple heuristic formulas, but these formulas are so vague and
imprecise as to be almost useless.
For example, Daniel Conkle advocates an approach that would
invalidate governmental messages disapproving of the religious
beliefs of "outsiders," but would not be "overly concerned" with
messages that offend the religious beliefs of "insiders."269 Howev-
er, even assuming this test would produce net gains in nonalien-
ation if it could be accurately applied,270 how is a court to decide
invalidates the challenged law or symbol once such a message is detected. The Court
makes no effort to ascertain whether compelled elimination of the symbol will produce
more alienation than the symbol itself produces.
267 For a discussion of the problem of alienating religious citizens, see Gedicks,
supra note 90, at 432-39.2
68 See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 213, at 1177-79 (adopting the norm of minimizing
political alienation); Feigenson, supra note 152, at 82 n.143, 112 (advocating a
requirement that government follow the "least alienating" alternative).
269 See Conkle, supra note 213, at 1177-79.
270 Although Conkle believes that messages offensive to "insiders" will produce
less overall alienation, there appears to be no a priori reason to assume this is true.
Indeed, on the assumption that in a majoritarian system there are likely to be more
"insiders" than "outsiders," one might suppose just the opposite to be the case.
Messages hostile to "insiders" should usually produce more overall alienation, if only
because there are more "insiders" who will take offense. The earlier hypothetical
about Baal-worshippers and Diana-worshippers reflects such a scenario. Given the
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who counts as an "insider" and who qualifies as an "outsider"?
Conkle offers little guidance except to suggest-that "insiders" are
"those who are part of America's religious mainstream" and that
"outsiders" include "individuals who hold minority religious or
irreligious views."271 But these categories are so elastic and
manipulable as to be almost useless. If one frames a category
broadly-"Christian," for example, or "theist"-then nearly all
American citizens will be "insiders." If one defines categories more
specifically-by denomination, for instance-then everyone will be
part of a religious minority. What about fundamentalist Christians,
for example? They clearly see themselves as "outsiders,"272 but
because they are "Christians," they may also be regarded as
"insiders."273 It is ironic, moreover, that the effort to classify
different groups of believers and nonbelievers as "insiders" and
"outsiders" for constitutional purposes would seem to ratify and, if
it were systematically implemented, even codify the very sense of
first-class and second-class status the nonalienation rationale is
ostensibly seeking to overcome.
If scholars amenable to the "no endorsement" test cannot
present workable methods for measuring net alienation, that failure
is hardly surprising. The task of measuring alienation is a formida-
ble one; in view of the shifting and closely contextual nature of the
problem, it is unlikely that any general rule of thumb will perform
the task with even approximate accuracy.27 4 In the end, there-
difficulty in the real world of categorizing citizens as "insiders" or "outsiders,"
however, any prediction in this regard must remain a matter of pure speculation.
271 Conkle, supra note 213, at 1178.
272 See MOORE, supra note 131, at 155-56 (describing the "perception of aloneness
among evangelical Protestants"); id. at 165 (noting "[tihe outsider consciousness that
[has] developed among average American Protestants"). Since 27 to 40 million
Americans regard themselves as Fundamentalists or evangelicals, see id. at 167, the
alienation felt by this group can hardly be dismissed as negligible.
273 Cf Joel F. Carpenter, From Fundamentalism to the New Evangelical Coalition, in
EVANGELICAUSM AND MODERN AMERICA 3, 9 (George Marsden ed., 1984) (explaining
how in different senses Fundamentalists have regarded themselves as both "insiders"
and "outsiders").
274 Indeed, the very concept of "alienation," or symbolic exclusion, is difficult to
grasp. What exactly is "alienation?" How, if at all, does "alienation" differ from the
"anger," "annoyance," "frustration," or "disappointment" that every person who finds
himself in a political minority is likely to feel? "Alienation" might refer to nothing
more than an awareness by an individual that she belongs to a religious minority,
accompanied by the realization that on some issues she is unlikely to prevail in the
political process. Cf Tushnet, supra note 140, at 712 ("[N]onadherents who believe
that they are excluded from the political community are merely expressing the
disappointment felt by everyone who has lost a fair fight in the arena of politics.").
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fore, the recommendation that government follow the "least
alienating alternative" is akin to prescriptions urging government to
"promote the general welfare" or to do what is best for the most
citizens. Such counsels may be sensible enough, but they cannot be
usefully embodied in uniform rules to be expounded by courts and
implemented in an across-the-board fashion. 275 Thus, the non-
alienation rationale, even if one accepts the value or good it
invokes, does not persuasively support a viable constitutional
doctrine of religious freedom.
G. A Categorical Assessment
The foregoing analysis indicates that the common nonreligious
rationales for religious freedom are vulnerable to serious objections.
Typically these rationales either fail to identify anything distinctive
about religion that warrants special constitutional treatment, or else
they resort to claims that are controversial and even implausible in
attempting to find something distinctive about religion. In addition,
these rationales, even if accepted as plausible, may still be non
sequiturs in that they fail to explain why religion deserves constitu-
tional freedom from governmental restrictions or regulations.
Upon reflection, the shortcomings of the nonreligious rationales
are hardly surprising. As discussed above, special constitutional
protection for religion rests on the assumption that religion is in
some important sense different from the general run of human
interests and activities. The fundamental problem is to vindicate
that assumption: how is religion different? From a religious
perspective, the question is not difficult to answer. Religion is
distinctive in its concern for spiritual goods, such as salvation of the
soul, and in its deference to the claims of divine or transcendent
authority.276 Nonreligious activities, pursuits, or disciplines do
not purport to embrace the same concerns or the same deference
to transcendent authority. From this perspective religion is not
That awareness may be uncomfortable, but is it a phenomenon for which constitu-
tional law can provide an efficacious remedy? Constitutional doctrine that stifles the
message will not likely alter the reality or a minority's experience of that reality.
275 Cf George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
863, 921-22 (1988) (arguing that whether removal of religiously offensive material
from school curricula will reduce strife presents a question "that courts are ill-
equipped to handle" and that is better left to local school boards).
2 6 See Ingber, supra note 5, at 285-87.
RISE AND FALL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
merely different from other human interests and activities, but is
wholly incommensurable with them.
If one is precluded from adopting a religious perspective,
however, the question of religion's distinctiveness becomes much
more difficult. The nonreligious rationales attempt to resolve the
issue by employing a dual strategy. They first focus upon the
"secular" or "temporal" dimensions of religion, thus placing religion
on a common plane or scale with other human interests and
concerns. Having made religion commensurable with nonreligion,
the rationales then attempt to differentiate religion by arguing that
it occupies a unique place on the common plane or has a different
order of value on the common scale. For example, religious faith
may be regarded as a set of beliefs or as a psychological condition,
like other beliefs or psychological conditions, but distinguishable as
a peculiarly fervent or unyielding set of beliefs or a uniquely intense
psychological condition. This type of assumption underlies the
notion that religion is a distinctively potent source of civil strife or
a singularly essential element in personal identity.
277
In attempting simultaneously to assimilate and to differentiate
religion, this dual strategy creates an internal tension that works to
nullify the force of the nonreligious rationales. The problem is not
that it is inevitably wrong to look at religion's secular or temporal
dimensions, or to put religion on a common plane with other
human activities and interests. Religion has its temporal dimen-
sions-that is why it is a proper subject of study for historians,
psychologists, and sociologists. However, religion's truly distinctive
qualities inhere, not surprisingly, in its religious or spiritual dimen-
sions. If one looks only at religion's temporal or secular aspects,
these distinctive qualities become blurred. And if one insists on
making claims of distinctiveness for religion while considering only
its temporal dimension, the claims are likely to be implausible;
277 Daniel Conkle argues:
[R]eligious beliefs are strong, but at the same time fragile. They are strong
because they are deeply embedded in the person's self. They are fragile for
essentially the same reason. Although a person can ignore-brush off-
certain types of insults, he cannot easily ignore a challenge to his self-
identity. In most cases, challenges of this sort will not change a person's
religious beliefs, given the strength and resilience of such beliefs. But the
challenges are likely to cause harm; they may amount to an assault on the
person's most fundamental sense of being, inflicting a type of psychological
injury, a form of mental anguish.
Conkle, supra note 213, at 1165.
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moreover, they will probably implicitly misrepresent the nature of
religious faith.
These difficulties are evident in the claims of nonreligious
rationales that religion is a special source of personal identity, moral
character, or civil strife. There is a sense in which these contentions
are true, or at least ought to be true, but it is not a strictly empirical
sense; and since the nonreligious rationales offer them as empirical
contentions, those rationales will inevitably seem suspect. The
problem can be illustrated by an examination of what may be called
the centrality contention-the contention that religion is the most
central element in personal identity.2 78 This contention is basic
to the personal autonomy rationale, and it is implicit in other
common rationales. Arguments that religious beliefs are a uniquely
powerful contributor to civic virtue, civil strife, or citizen alienation,
all appear to assume that persons regard their religious commit-
ments as more central and vital than other kinds of beliefs or
interests. But is the centrality contention true?
Prior discussion has already raised this question; further
difficulties will now be noted. From a religious perspective, the
centrality contention may be true-but in a complex, elusive sense.
In the first place, the contention may state a theological truth.
Although different religious traditions would describe the matter in
different terms, one familiar position asserts that the most crucial
issue for every person-and an issue that is in an important way
defining or constitutive of who and what a person is-concerns the
principal object of a person's love. For Augustine, humanity was
divided between those who love God and those who love primarily
themselves. The two great cities, the City of God and the City of
Man, are constituted by these two different kinds of love. 279 This
position might be understood to mean that a person's orientation
toward a fundamentally religious issue is central to or even
constitutive of personal identity.
But the centrality contention is true, in this view, only if it is
understood and accepted as a theological assertion rather than as a
statement about empirical psychology. The "two cities" position
278 See supra note 213.
279 See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 14.13 (Gerald G. Walsh et al. trans.,
1958) ("The one City began with the love of God; the other had its beginnings in the
love of self."); see also id. at 14.28 ("What we see, then, is that two societies have
issued from two kinds of love. Worldly society has flowered from a selfish love which
dared to despise even God, whereas the communion of saints is rooted in a love of
God that is ready to trample on self.").
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does not generate a prediction that most human beings as a matter
of conscious belief or behavior hold religious faith to be the most
essential part of their personal identity. On the basis of her
theology, the believer or theologian may see a lack of faith or an
absence of the love of God as the central distinguishing feature of
the citizens of the worldly city; but it does not follow, and indeed it
is wholly unlikely, that these individuals would define themselves in
this way. Moreover, the dominant characteristics of any actual
temporal society will be those of the City of Man, not the City of
God; Augustine had no illusions on this point.280 Hence, if the
theological assertion about the centrality of religion is recast as an
empirical psychological proposition, it is likely to prove false.
Even for self-conscious religious believers, moreover, the
contention that religion is central to personal identity should be
understood as an aspirational statement. Christians are in principle
committed to the precept that they must love God with all of their
heart, soul, mind, and strength.281 This precept might again
suggest that a religious faith is at the core of the Christian's
personal identity. But this proposition cannot be taken as a simple
factual assertion. Virtually every Christian falls far short of actually
realizing the kind of love his faith prescribes, as the most devout are
the first to admit.2 82 This deficiency does not prove that Chris-
tians are insincere-although, of course, they may be-but rather that
Christianity, like other religious faiths, entails an internal conflict or
struggle, and that the Christian's professions of belief often express
aspirations, not accomplished facts.
283
Even this statement oversimplifies the matter, however, because
even when taken in an aspirational sense, statements of religious
faith may not express the objectives toward which believers, in an
empirical sense, do aspire, but rather the objectives toward which
they believe they should aspire.284 In this way, even aspirational
280 See id. at 18.1 ("[A]s far as human history goes, the [City of God] lives like an
alien inside the [City of Man]."); id. at 18.51 ("So it falls out that in this world, in evil
days like these, the Church walks onward like a wayfarer stricken by the world's
hostility .... It was never any different .... So it shall be until this world is no
more.").
281 See Mark 12:29-30.
282 See THOMAS A KEMPIS, THE IMITATION OF CHRIST 38-39, 87, 122-24, 176-78
(Aloysius Croft & Harry F. Bolton trans., 1962).
283 Cf Greenawalt, supra note 137, at 1025 ("Not everyone who has religious
beliefs accords them the paramountcy in their lives that the beliefs call for.").
284 This complex mindset is expressed in Augustine's prayer, offered in the early
stages of his conversion: "Grant me chastity and continency, but not yet." ST.
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statements have a theological content: the believer is struggling to
make her actual aspirations consistent with her religious
beliefs. 285 But the matter is still more complex because the
religious struggle occurs within the realm of belief itself. This
internal conflict is expressed in the paradoxical plea: "Lord, I
believe; help thou mine unbelief."286  Hence, even statements
about what Christians believe are misleading, and very likely false, if
they are understood in a merely factual or static sense.
In sum, the propositions upon which the nonreligious rationales
rely-propositions about the special nature and consequences of
religion-might be true if understood in a theological sense, or in an
aspirational sense with a theological component. But the prohibito-
ry interpretation excludes theological claims; it requires these
propositions to be taken in an empirical sense. And when under-
stood as simple empirical assertions their status is quite dubious.
At some historical moments, in some societies, they may be roughly
correct. 28 7 At most times and in most places, however, they are
probably false. Indeed, the recurring biblical depictions of history
as God's struggle with his people-a struggle that in the short-term,
empirical sense God most often loses 28 8 -suggest that these
propositions, understood empirically, will usually be false. Human
beings typically will not make faith in God the center of their lives.
AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO 135 (J. G.
Pilkington trans., 1927).
285 Harvey Cox observes that "ultimately the most enduring tension between the
secular and the spiritual runs straight through the soul of the individual." Harvey
Cox, Citizens and Believers: Always Strangers?, in TRANSFORMING FAITH, supra note 83,
at 53-54.
286 Mark 9:24.
287 Usually, however, the contention that at a particular period people cared so
deeply about religion that they were willing to, for example, resort to civil war over
it is, at best, avast oversimplification. For instance, depictions of the English civil war
as a religious controversy sparked by perceived Papist practices which set Puritans,
like Milton and Cromwell, against the monarchy, as represented by the Archbishop
Laud, fail to take into account the variety of political, social, and economic factors
that also influenced the conflict. For an overview of the various historical interpreta-
tions of the English civil war, most of which have emphasized secular rather than
religious explanations, see J.G.A. Pocock, Introduction, in THREE BRITISH REVOLU-
TIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 3-12 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980).
288 This depiction is presented in the Old Testament in, for example, the books
of Deuteronomy, Isaiah, and Jeremiah. A similar view is expressed in the New
Testament injesus' lament: "OJerusalem,Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets,
and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy
children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye
would not!" Matthew 23:37.
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The nonreligious rationales thus offer contentions about the
special character of religion in the sense in which those contentions
are most questionable. For that reason, these rationales provide an
infirm foundation upon which to build an enduring constitutional
commitment to religious freedom.
H. Commitment Without Reasons?
It would be too much to say that the nonreligious rationales
have no persuasive force at all. Indeed, these rationales are
regularly invoked to justify religious freedom.289 In view of their
serious defects, however, one must wonder whether this is an
instance in which the conclusion gives force to the arguments,
rather than vice versa. We still have a textual and historical
commitment to religious freedom, and it is natural to assume there
must be some justification for that commitment. Even though the
nonreligious rationales are frail, one might conclude that if they are
the only ones available they will just have to do.
Rather than force a conclusion to justify implausible premises,
however, it would seem more sensible to take the conclusion as a
given and give up the effort to supply premises. This observation
might suggest that our inability to articulate any powerful and
admissible justification for constitutional religious freedom is
merely an academic problem. Perhaps we do not need any
currently plausible justification to support the commitment to
religious liberty. The fact is that we have made that commitment;
it is written for anyone to see in the First Amendment of the
Constitution. Nor does there appear to be a movement to repeal
the religion clauses. So why does it matter if we cannot articulate
any compelling rationale to justify that commitment?
One response is that without a plausible rationale for the
commitment to religious liberty we cannot understand what that
commitment entails. It is commonplace that legal enactments
should be interpreted to effectuate their purposes. But a law's
"purpose" arises out of, and is a projection of, its justification.
Therefore, if we cannot articulate a convincing justification for the
commitment to religious freedom then we cannot know its purpose,
and we are accordingly paralyzed in our efforts to interpret the
commitment.
289 For a general discussion of their use in Supreme Court opinions, see Smith,
supra note 15.
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In addition, it is unrealistic to expect a commitment to retain its
vitality merely because it is written into the Constitution. In a
certain society or legal culture-the kind in which the highest
recommendation of a law is that it has existed "from time immemo-
rialr 29 0 -the fact that a commitment to religious liberty is ex-
pressed in the Constitution might be sufficient. But clearly we do
not live in that kind of culture; the pragmatic concern for doing
what makes sense now is too strong.2 91 This aspect of our culture
is expressed in Holmes's oft-quoted pronouncement: "It is revolting
to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."
292
Perhaps the most determined current proponent in the legal
academy of a Burkean respect for the past concedes that this
attitude has been defunct for generations and that the position is
not only unpopular but almost incomprehensible today.
293
Our experience with other constitutional provisions supports
this assessment. Constitutional history chronicles the rise and
decline of various constitutional provisions as they came to be seen
as having or lacking a significant, timely rationale. In 1927,
speaking for the Supreme Court, Holmes expressed the marginal
status of the Equal Protection Clause by describing it as the "last
resort of constitutional arguments." 294 Today, with the increased
concern for equality which has been evident at least since Brown v.
Board of Education,295 that clause has assumed central significance
in constitutional adjudication. By contrast, the clause forbidding
impairment of contracts, once a prominent feature in the constitu-
tional landscape, has become virtually invisible.2 96 Its decline
290 This was, apparently, the mindset of the common law in its classical period.
For a helpful discussion, see GERALDJ. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 4-29 (1986).
291 For an indication of the pervasive appeal of legal pragmatism, see Symposium
on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569
(1990).
292 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
293 See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1043-47
(1990).
294 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
295 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 96 SeeJOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrTrIoNAL LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986) ("[U]ntil
the late nineteenth century the contract clause was the principal provision the Court
used to void legislation that infringed on private property rights. Within the last 100
years, however, the Court rarely has relied on the clause as a reason to invalidate state
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cannot be attributed to the absence of potential modern applica-
tions (in the way, for instance, that we might account for the
dormant condition of the Third Amendment's prohibition on the
quartering of soldiers). Rather, the assumptions on which the
Contracts Clause appears to be based-assumptions grounded in
notions of the minimalist state-are incompatible with the nature of
modern government, 297 and so the clause has been quietly retired
from active duty. It is not fanciful to think that unless a powerful,
timely rationale for affording special constitutional status to religion
can be articulated, the religious freedom clauses might well follow
a similar course.
V. THE DETERIORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The constitutional commitment to religious freedom arose from,
and can be adequately justified only by reference to, a religious
rationale that is no longer admissible in legal and academic
discourse. Proposed secular replacements for this justification are
vulnerable. If the nonreligious rationales sometimes seem to carry
the day, that may be because they lead to a conclusion that we
instinctively support-likely a case of the conclusion earning favor
for the arguments, not vice versa.
Such a situation is plainly unstable; it is a condition that invites
the collapse of the commitment to religious freedom. And, indeed,
signs of serious deterioration are apparent. These "signs of the
times" will be discussed under two headings: incoherence in
constitutional reasoning and withdrawal of constitutional protection
for religious freedom.
A. Incoherence: County of Allegheny
If a legal culture is confronted with a constitutional commitment
it instinctively respects but cannot adequately understand orjustify,
one would expect to find considerable confusion in the interpreta-
tion and application of that commitment. Unsurprisingly, therefore,
judicial decisions expounding and enforcing the Constitution's
legislation which retroactively affected contractual rights . . ").
297 See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 8-6, at 578-81 (describing changes in thinking about
the role of government that undermined the idea of contractual liberty as a
foundation for constitutional thought); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCT-
ING AMERICAN LAw 6-22 (1984) (describing how the rise of the "activist state"
undermined the sanctity of older common law notions of contract and property).
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religion clauses are characterized by massive incoherence. The
disarray is by now notorious. With respect to the Court's Establish-
ment Clause decisions, Charles Taylor offers the restrained
observation that "there does not seem to be any defensible
intellectual principle underlying them."298  Philip Kurland puts
the point more bluntly: the Supreme Court's establishment
decisions seem "derived from Alice's Adventures in Wonder-
land."299 John Mansfield dismisses the Court's religion clause
opinions as "the incantation of verbal formulae devoid of explanato-
ry value."
0 0
The celebrated conflict that, at least until recently, often pitted
the Establishment Clause against the Free Exercise Clause has often
been cited as evidence of the unhappy condition of current religion
clause jurisprudence. 0 1 Another favorite method of demonstrat-
ing the prevailing confusion has been to recite a list of paired but
apparently incompatible decisions purporting to interpret the
religion clauses. 0 2 As the incoherence of religion clause doctrine
has matured, however, it is no longer necessary to compare
different doctrines or different lines of cases; the confusion is
manifest within single decisions.
In this respect, County of Allegheny v. ACLU 303 is exemplary.
The case represents the culmination of modern Establishment
Clause interpretation in two respects. First, although the Supreme
Court had referred to the "no endorsement" test in earlier deci-
sions,3 4 in County of Allegheny a majority of Justices unequivocally
298 Taylor, supra note 202, at 111.
299 Kurland, supra note 261, at 10. For similarly caustic criticisms, see LEONARD
W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 128
(1986) ("[Establishment Clause decisions] make distinctions that would glaze the
minds of medieval scholastics."); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 86, at 1611 n.146
(noting the Court has displayed "spectacular incoherence in articulating the
constitutional law of religion"); Rex E. Lee, The Religion Clauses: Problems and
Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337,338 (1986) ("A decent argument can be made that
the net contribution of the Court's precedents toward a cohesive body of law... has
been zero. Indeed, some would say that it has been less than zero .... ."); Mark V.
Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27
WM. & MARY L. REv. 997, 997 (1986) ("[V]irtually everyone who has thought about
the religion clauses, finds the Supreme Court's treatment of religion clause issues
unsatisfactory.").
300 John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy
of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REv. 847, 848 (1984).
Sol See, e.g., Choper, supra note 187, at 947-48.
302 See LEVY, supra note 299, at 128-29, 162-63; Kurland, supra note 261, at 10-11;
Paulsen, supra note 245, at 316; Tushnet, supra note 140, at 705.
sos 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
304 See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,488-
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embraced that doctrine8 05-a doctrine which, as 1 have argued in
this Article, makes clear the implications of the prohibitory
interpretation of religious freedom. Second, perhaps more than any
other single decision, County ofAllegheny reveals the multidimension-
al confusion inherent in the prevailing understanding of religious
freedom. The case reflects confusion in the application of the
doctrine to specific facts, in the connection (or lack of connection)
between the doctrine and its ostensible rationale, and most
fundamentally in the latent ambivalence of the prevailing position
with respect to religious freedom itself.
In County of Allegheny the Court applied the "no endorsement"
test to invalidate a municipal display of a Christmas creche while
approving the display of a Jewish menorah. While conceding that
the "no endorsement" test is "highly context specific" and requires
"often difficult line drawing," Justice O'Connor insisted that the test
is "capable of consistent application."30 6 But it is hard to imagine
a more compelling refutation of that claim than the one provided
in the case itself by the wildly divergent opinions of theJustices who
accepted and attempted to apply the test.
A central question in the case was whether a public holiday
season display featuring an eighteen foot menorah alongside a forty-
five foot Christmas tree sent a message endorsing religion. To
Justice Blackmun, the Christmas tree itself was a purely secular
symbol. Moreover, its greater size had the effect of neutralizing the
potential religious message of the menorah. 0 7 Taken as a whole,
therefore, the display communicated "not a simultaneous endorse-
ment of both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but instead, a secular
celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of
Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition."
308
Justice O'Connor saw things differently. While acceptingJustice
Blackmun's characterization of the Christmas tree as a "secular"
symbol, she disagreed with Blackmun's perception that the tree
somehow neutralized the religious symbolism of the menorah.30 9
Nonetheless, she concluded that the display did not endorse
Judaism, or religion generally, but rather sent a message celebrating
89 (1986); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
305 See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
3o6 Id. at 631-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
307 See id. at 616-18.
308 Id. at 617-18.
309 See id. at 632-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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"pluralism and freedom of belief."3 1 0 This message, she believed,
was permissibly secular.
The display generated a different perception altogether for
Justice Brennan. He insisted thatJustices Blackmun and O'Connor
went "badly astray" in regarding the Christmas tree as a secular
symbol.311 Although Justice Brennan conceded that "the tree
alone may be deemed predominantly secular," he declared that "it
can hardly be so characterized when placed next to such a forth-
rightly religious symbol."3 1 2  Moreover, Justice Blackmun had
things exactly backwards in asserting that the Christmas tree's
superior size neutralized the menorah's religious significance. The
tree, Justice Brennan noted, was "rather conventionally sized." On
the other hand, though much smaller than the tree in actual size,
the menorah was large for a menorah, and thus was "far more eye
catching." Furthermore, while the tree could be seen as conveying
multiple messages, the menorah conveyed only a single, clearly
religious message. As a result, the menorah transformed the tree
into a religious symbol, not vice versa.
3 13
Justice Brennan also rejected Justice O'Connor's view that the
display was permissible because it celebrated "pluralism and
freedom of belief." Even if the display in fact endorsed these
values, he observed, it was religious pluralism and freedom of
religious belief that were most obviously represented.3 14  More-
over, since not all religions believe in religious pluralism, a message
endorsing such pluralism favors some religions over others, and
thereby impermissibly offends religions that do not accept the value
of pluralism.3 15 Justices Stevens and Marshall joined in Justice
310 Id. at 635.
31 See id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
312 Id.
313 See id. at 642.
314 See id. at 640 ("[T]he 'pluralism' to which justice O'Connor refers is religious
pluralism, and the 'freedom of belief' she emphasizes is freedom of religious belief.").
Justice Brennan considered the possibility thatJustice O'Connor might have perceived
in the display a message of cultural pluralism, not of specifically religious pluralism.
But ifJustice O'Connor were approving the display based on this kind of perception,
he argued, she ought equally to approve displays featuring "a menorah next to a giant
firecracker" or "a Latin cross next to an Easter bunny." In each instance, Justice
Brennan observed, "I do not sense that this display would pass muster underJustice
O'Connor's view." Id. at 640 n.*. SinceJustice O'Connor did not explicitly address
Justice Brennan's hypotheticals, however, the constitutionality of menorah-firecracker
and cross-bunny displays remains in doubt pending further illumination by the Court.
315 See id. at 645.
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Brennan's opinion, and Justice Stevens also wrote a separate
opinion that largely agreed with Justice Brennan's analysis.
3 16
This disarray plainly reveals the uncertainty and inconsistency
that plague the application of current doctrine. 317 The Justices
were evidently able to perceive, or not to perceive, essentially any
message they chose; and there is no rational method for determin-
ing whether what Justice Blackmun perceived was somehow more
"correct" than what Justices O'Connor, Brennan, and Stevens
sensed.318  But, the Court's confusion affected not only the
application of doctrine to facts; it also infected the Court's attempt
to relate the "no endorsement" doctrine to its stated rationale.
The ostensible purpose of the "no endorsement" test is to
ensure that no citizens will be made to feel like "outsiders, or less
than full members of the political community," because of govern-
mental endorsement or disapproval of religion.3 19  Yet it is
virtually certain, as the differing perceptions of the Justices
themselves suggest, that regardless of the outcome reached by the
courts in this and similar controversies, some citizens will perceive
the outcome as endorsing or disapproving of religion.3 20 Hence,
as argued earlier, the "no endorsement" test is sure to aggravate
alienation in some citizens. The Court attempted to deal with the
problem by declaring the dispositive perception to be that of a
"reasonable" observer.321 But that position does nothing to solve
316 See id. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317 See Gey, supra note 140, at 119 (asserting that the endorsement test is "so
malleable that it can mean anything"); cf Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny
v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 503,
504 (1990) ("[The Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU further confused
the already chaotic jurisprudence relating to the state's involvement with religious
symbols and practices.").
318 Consequently, even supporters of the "no endorsement" doctrine have
criticized the decision for its lack of clarity. Neal Feigenson, an enthusiastic
proponent of the Court's general approach, concedes that the "no endorsement"
doctrine as applied by the Court has done nothing to enhance clarity or predictability
in the law, see Feigenson, supra note 152, at 91-92, and he observes that County of
Allegheny "did little to ameliorate the confusion in a concededly muddled area of
constitutional law." Id. at 53.
s'9 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at
595.
S20 Cf Mark V. Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33
Loy. L. REv. 221, 238 (1987) ("Lynch[, the 1984 nativity scene decision,] was like a
slap in the face to many Jews, but surely a holding that a municipal creche was
unconstitutional would have beenjust as much a slap in the face to a segment of the
Christian community.").
321 See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the problem. Instead, the Court's doctrine adds insult to injury by
telling a losing party not only that she has lost, but that her
perceptions of endorsement or disapproval have been disregarded
because she is not a "reasonable" observer.
322
Finally, and most fundamentally, County of Allegheny reflects the
confusion that must inevitably arise when a constitutional commit-
ment is interpreted in such a way that it negates its own reason for
existence. The consequence of this difficulty is an unavoidable
ambivalence toward religious liberty. Such ambivalence is discern-
ible injustice Brennan's remarkable suggestion that it was unconsti-
tutional for Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, to send a message
endorsing religious pluralism and freedom of religious belief.
323
Upon first consideration, one may wonder whether justice Brennan
could have been serious about his suggestion. After all, by
forbidding the establishment of any official religion, the Establish-
ment Clause itself unequivocally favors religious pluralism. Carried
to its logical conclusion, Justice Brennan's position would mean that
the Establishment Clause itself is unconstitutional-on Establishment
Clause grounds. Similarly, the Free Exercise Clause would seem to
express concern for and approval of the freedom of religious belief.
Is it therefore unconstitutional for government (or the Court) to
invoke or express approval of the Free Exercise Clause?
As remarkable and apparently self-contradictory as it seems,
however, Justice Brennan's position is in a different sense perfectly
logical. Not all forms of freedom and pluralism are equally valued;
-22 The conflict between the "no endorsement" doctrine and its own rationale is
manifest in Justice Blackmun's treatment of the dissentingJustices. As noted, the
controlling opinions by justices Blackmun and O'Connor emphasized the need to
avoid alienating any citizens or making them feel like outsiders because of their
religious views. The opinions did not directly discuss how this policy should apply to
the apparently substantial body of citizens who, on the basis of their own religious
views, are offended and alienated by the systematic, judicially directed removal of
traditional religious symbols from public life. However, a tame version of this view
was suggested in Justice Kennedy's opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, White, and
Rehnquist, which implied that the position taken by the majority might reflect a
"latent hostility" or "callous indifference" toward religion. See id. at 657, 663-64
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). At least Blackmun
interpreted the opinion as making such a charge, and he sharply rebuked Kennedy
for expressingviews "as offensive as they are absurd." Id. at 610. As noted, however,
Kennedy's suggestions are no doubt representative, apart from their mildness, of the
perceptions of large numbers of American citizens. And it is just possible that the
best way to make these citizens feel like fully included members of the community is
not to condemn their perceptions, which clearly reflect their own religious beliefs, as
"offensive" and "absurd."
323 See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
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hence, to celebrate religious pluralism and religious freedom does
send a message suggesting a special concern for religion. And if
religious freedom means that government must be neutral regarding
religion,3 24 then the celebration of religious freedom (with the
favorable message that such a celebration entails) is inconsistent
with the meaning of religious freedom. Hence, Justice Brennan's
position accurately reflects the logical course-and the self-canceling
culmination-of the prevailing interpretation of religious freedom.
B. Withdrawal of Protection: Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith
A second consequence of the loss of a viable justification for the
constitutional commitment to religious liberty is that courts may
simply decide that the commitment has lost its vitality and should
no longer be enforced. The incoherence accompanying judicial
efforts to expound the meaning of that commitment might naturally
reinforce this impulse: one obvious way to avoid the confusion
surrounding religion clause jurisprudence is to retreat from the
effort to construe or enforce the clauses at all. It is not surprising,
therefore, that recent decisions reflect a tendency to reduce or
withdraw protection for religious freedom.
This trend is discernible in a number of areas. The relaxation
of protection against state intrusion into the affairs of religious
institutions is one notable instance.3 25 Another is the minimalist
interpretation the Court has given to Title VII's requirement that
employers accommodate their employees' religious faiths.3 26 But
perhaps the most dramatic example is the virtual abandonment of
the Free Exercise Clause in the recent case of Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.3 27 Just as County of
324 See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 644 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("We have ... interpreted [the Establishment] Clause to require
neutrality, not just among religions, but between religion and nonreligion.").
325 For a valuable discussion which links the declining respect for church
autonomy to the exclusion of religious concepts from constitutional discourse, see
generally Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of
Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057 (1989). See also GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, II (Dean M. Kelley ed., 1986); Smith, supra note 142, at 982-85.
326 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (ruling that
employers are relieved from the statutory accommodation requirement on grounds
of "undue hardship" if accommodation would entail "more than a de minimis cost").
For a critical discussion, see David E. Wheeler, Establishment Clause Neutrality and the
Reasonable Accommodation Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901 (1977).
327 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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Allegheny represents a culmination of troubling developments in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Smith reaches a low point in
modern constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
The claimants in Smith were members of the Native American
Church who were discharged from their jobs with a private drug
rehabilitation organization because they used peyote for sacramental
purposes. Oregon denied their applications for unemployment
compensation, reasoning that because state law prohibits the use of
peyote the claimants had been discharged for "misconduct," making
them ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. 28  The facts
of the case were similar in significant respects to those of other
cases in which the Court had upheld free exercise claims. In
Sherbert v. Verner,3 29 for example, the Court had ruled that South
Carolina could not deny unemployment compensation to a Seventh-
Day Adventist who refused available employment because of her
religious scruples against working on Saturday. And in Thomas v.
Review Board,3 ° the Court had held that Indiana must provide
unemployment compensation to aJehovah's Witness who left his job
after coming to believe that his work in a munitions plant was
sinful.3 3 1 In reaching these results, the Court had indicated that
if a state law burdens an individual's practice of her religion, the
state should exempt that individual unless the state has an especially
important interest in requiring compliance.
3 3 2
Under this doctrine of free exercise exemptions, and on the
strength of precedents such as Sherbert and Thomas, the Court could
readily have ruled for the claimants in Smith. Conversely, if the
Justices were disposed to deny relief, as they seem to have been,
they might have ruled that Oregon's interest in controlling the use
of drugs-an interest the state had embodied in a criminal statute-
overrode the claimants' free exercise rights, thus leaving free
exercise doctrine undisturbed.3 3 The majority, however, chose
328 See id. at 1597-98.
329 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
330 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
331 The Court reaffirmed this position in more recent unemployment compensa-
tion cases. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
332 For other recent cases asserting this balancing test, see Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1990); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). For a useful overview and analysis of free
exercise doctrine before Smith, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 933-66 (1989).
333Justice O'Connor took this position. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606-15
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to adopt neither of these alternatives. Instead, it declared that so
long as a law is general and neutral in its application, that law's
interference with an individual's practice of his religion provides no
constitutional ground for exempting that individual from compli-
ance.
3 3 4
Although abandoning the doctrine of free exercise exemptions,
the Court indicated that a law which actually discriminates against
religion, or which proscribes a practice because it is religious, would
be unacceptable.3 35 However, laws that consciously discriminate
against religion are uncommon,336 and in any event are probably
invalid on other constitutional grounds.3 37  Consequently, Smith
appears to leave the Free Exercise Clause without independent
constitutional content and thus, for practical purposes, largely
meaningless. 338 Douglas Laycock comments caustically that "[t]he
free exercise of religion now means that churches cannot be taxed
or regulated any more heavily than General Motors."
339
Critics have attacked the decision as a dramatic departure from
modern doctrine, and on a verbal level they are right. The Court
attempted to square its ruling with the pronouncements in earlier
free exercise cases, but as commentators have convincingly shown,
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
334 See id. at 1600.
335 See id. at 1599.
336 The Court's own examples suggest how far removed this non-discrimination
constraint is from contemporary conflicts in this country. The Court suggested that
it would be unconstitutional for a state to prohibit religious believers from "bowing
down before a golden calf" or from making statues to be used for worship purposes.
See id.
337 Such discriminatory legislation would likely violate the Equal Protection
Clause. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (asserting that equal
protection suspect classifications include "race, religion, and alienage"); ef. Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (finding an equal protection component in the
Establishment Clause). In addition, laws specifically discriminating against religion
would often have a content-based impact upon expression, and thus mightviolate the
Free Speech Clause. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (invalidating on free
speech grounds a university regulation preventing student religious groups from
using university facilities for group meetings).
"' Although it might be suggested that the Free Exercise Clause still protects
religious beliefs, such freedom of belief is protected under the rubric of free speech
in any case. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,234-35 (1977) (declaring
that "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that the individual should be
free to believe as he will").
339 Douglas Laycock, Forma; Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1009 (1990); see also Milner S. Ball, The Unfree
Exercise of Religion, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 39,49 (1991) (arguing that Smith is "desperate-
ly wrong and terribly damaging").
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its arguments in this respect were patently untenable.340  As an
exhibition of legal analysis, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Smith
is an intellectual disaster. Perhaps the most remarkable feature in
a generally remarkable opinion is the majority's reliance on
language from Minersville School District v. Gobitis341 to prove that
religious objectors have never been excused from compliance with
generally applicable laws because of their religious scruples.3
42
The majority seemed not to notice that Gobitis was overruled just
three years later in the well-known case of West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette,343 and that in any event Gobitis was decid-
ed well before the elaboration of the doctrine of free exercise
exemptions in cases such as Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder.3
44
Michael McConnell notes that "[r]elying on Gobitis without mention-
ing Barnette is like relying on Plessy v. Ferguson without mentioning
Brown v. Board of Education.
" 345
At a deeper level, however, Smith represents not a departure
from, but rather the culmination of modern free exercise jurispru-
dence. Smith disavowed (without admitting it) much of what the
recent decisions said, but it respected and followed what those
decisions did. Since the 1972 decision in Yoder, when the Court
ruled that Wisconsin could not compel Amish children to attend a
formal school after the age of fourteen, the Court had consistently
rejected virtually every claim for a free exercise exemption that it
confronted. The only exception concerned unemployment
compensation cases similar on their facts to Sherbert, which the
Court decided (and may continue to decide where no criminal law
is at issue) simply on the strength of that precedent. 346 In other
cases, the Court either rejected the religious claims with little
340 See, e.g.,James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV.
91 (1991) (concluding that the Court in Smith "mistreated precedent [and] used
shoddy reasoning"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CH. L. REV. 1109, 1114-27 (1990) (criticizing the Court for misreading
the Free Exercise Clause, ignoring its historical context, and using precedent in a
"troubling" fashion). Although defending the doctrinal revisionism of Smith, William
Marshall concedes that "[t]he decision, as written, is neither persuasive nor well-
crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise jurisprudence and
its use of precedent borders on fiction." Marshall, supra note 215, at 308-09.
341 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
342 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
343 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
344 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
345 McConnell, supra note 340, at 1124 (citation omitted).
346 See supra note 331.
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attempt to duplicate the careful balancing apparent in Yoder,3 47 or
it declared balancing unnecessary for cases involving the mili-
tary,348 prisons,349 or the management of federal property.
350
Thus, any active judicial commitment on the part of the Court to
protect the free exercise of religion was virtually defunct even
before Smith officially announced the demise of the free exercise
exemption doctrine. In this sense, Smith merely made explicit what
was implicit in earlier rulings.
3 51
Smith also made explicit what other recent cases only assumed
by confronting and rejecting the religious justification for religious
freedom. Cases claiming a religious exemption from general laws
present the religious justification in perhaps its purest form. The
believer asserts, in essence, that she should be excused from
compliance with a particular law because of her prior or superior
obligation to a higher authority. This assertion is virtually a
paraphrase of the primary argument advanced in Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance.3 52 The claim to a religious exemp-
tion, in short, is in itself tantamount to an assertion of the religious
justification. In Smith the Court considered and rejected that
justificatory claim.
The majority's reason for rejecting the religious justification
deserves attention. The opinion offered a prudential rationale: the
recognition of free exercise exemptions would be "courting
anarchy" by making every person's conscience a "law unto it-
self."3 53 But this prudential argument cannot adequately explain
the Court's position. In the first place, so long as free exercise
347 See; e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985) (declining to recognize free exercise exemption to the Fair Labor Standards
Act); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that conflict between
religious belief and obligation to pay taxes affords no basis for resisting such taxes).
§48 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
349 See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
350 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
1 Writing shortly before the Smith decision, Mark Tushnet observed that "people
are led to believe that there is a general doctrine of mandatory accommodation, a
belief that the Court's decisions basically belie." Mark V. Tushnet, "Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 373, 379.
Although criticizing Smith for abandoning the doctrine of free exercise exemptions,
Michael McConnell acknowledges that even before Smith "the free exercise doctrine
was more talk than substance." McConnell, supra note 340, at 1109. He points out,
however, that the doctrine was sometimes taken more seriously by state and lower
federal courts. See id. at 1110.
352 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
353 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605, 1606.
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doctrine is subject to a balancing test-and everyone involved in the
case assumed that it would be-the Court could adjust the balance
to prevent religious claims from undermining the social order.
Decades of experience with free exercise doctrine suggest that
courts are more likely to err on the side of order than of anarchy.
Moreover, in an important sense the Court's prudential
argument assumes the point at issue. If the religious justification is
valid, if compelling the religious believer to comply with a general
law really would offend a higher power, then the Court would be ill-
advised to reject the claim on the basis of purely prudential
concerns. The prudential argument is the kind of rationale a court
is likely to offer after it has already decided that the religious
justification is unacceptable.
If the prudential argument does not adequately account for the
Court's rejection of the claimants' religious rationale, then how
should the Court's position be explained? One possibility is that the
Justices who composed the majority considered the religious
rationale and rejected it on its merits because they do not believe
that any higher authority or higher law exists. This explanation
seems implausible, however, particularly in the case ofJustice Scalia,
who authored the majority opinion.3 54 It is more likely that the
Justices did not reject the religious justification because of any
intrinsic substantive implausibility, but rather that they believed
religious claims to be excluded from official consideration by the
logic of the secular state, as expressed in the prohibitory interpreta-
tion of religious freedom.
Read closely, the language of the majority opinion provides at
least tacit support for this explanation. As noted, the Court
asserted that a doctrine of free exercise exemptions would make
every believer's conscience "a law unto itself."355 Initially, this
assertion appears to be a willful mischaracterization of the believer's
claim. In asking for a free exercise exemption the believer
emphatically does not claim to be the source of law for himself; the
whole point of the claim is that the believer is bound by a heterono-
mous obligation imposed by a higher authority. The "law unto
itself" characterization, however, may be understood as the
translation of this religious claim into a language in which no higher
354 See Barbara A. Perry, The Ltfe and Death of the "Catholic Seat" on the United States
Supreme Court, 6J.L. & POL. 55, 86 (1989) (suggesting that Scalia is heavily influenced
by his Roman Catholic education).
355 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
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authority can be acknowledged. If there is no higher authority-or
at least none that the state is permitted to recognize-then regard-
less of how the claimant characterizes his belief, the source of the
obligation invoked by the believer can only be the individual
himself. Hence, the Court's very characterization of the free
exercise claim reflects its assumption of a prohibitory interpretation
that precludes recognition of religious beliefs as a ground for
governmental or judicial decisions.
In sum, although earlier decisions tacitly dismissed the religious
justification for religious freedom by not invoking it or by ruling
against claims for free exercise exemptions, the dismissal became
explicit in Smith. Smith also exhibits the consequences of that
dismissal-the withdrawal of constitutional protection for the free
exercise of religion.
CONCLUSION
This Article paints a bleak picture of current constitutional
discourse in the area of religious freedom. In the tradition of
happy endings, it ought now to explain the solution to these
difficulties, or at least to suggest that the situation is not as dismal
as it may seem. In that spirit, I will conclude with two more
optimistic observations. A forewarning is in order: these observa-
tions give no cause or excuse for rejoicing; they seek only to elevate
the tone of the Article from unmitigated to mitigated pessimism.
The first optimistic observation is that history may not be
deterministic. Arnold Toynbee, chronicling what he often seemed
to regard as the fatalistic flow of history through a series of regular,
repetitive cycles, nonetheless insisted on the possibility of human
freedom, and thus of escape from the usual cyclical pattern.3 56
In this Article I have argued that the deterioration of our constitu-
tional commitment to religious freedom is the natural consequence
of a fatal flaw-a paradoxical, self-canceling quality-within the
prevailing modern understanding of what religious freedom means.
But there is nothing necessary or logically inexorable about our
modern understanding of religious freedom; coherent and defensi-
ble alternatives are available that do not produce the debilitating
356 See 9 ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HIsTORY 167-405 (1954). Toynbee
ultimately offered a religious explanation for human freedom: humans can escape
the deterministic Law of Nature by accepting the Law of Love, which is God's
"perfect law of liberty." Id. at 395.
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consequences evident in constitutional discourse today.357 It is
always possible that the Supreme Court and the constitutional
community may abandon the prohibitory interpretation of religious
freedom and place our constitutional commitment on firmer
footing.
It is hard to be sanguine, however, about that prospect.
Although freedom to alter the apparent course of history is a
theoretical possibility, dominant ideas seem to gain a momentum
that resists conscious changes of direction. Moreover, legal ideas
become embedded in the broader workings of politics and culture,
acquiring an additional mass that increases their inertia.
This inertia is observable in the law of religious freedom. At
this juncture, one can plausibly view the modern jurisprudence of
the religion clauses as a gradual unfolding of a few core ideas-the
"wall" of separation, governmental neutrality, the secular state-
expressed in the first modern establishment case, Everson v. Board
of Education.35 8 Everson purported to draw those ideas from
history, but at least as early as 1965 it was clear that Everson was bad
history, for which a thoughtful Harvard law professor convincingly
and sharply rebuked the Court. 59 "By superficial and purposive
interpretations of the past," Professor Howe charged, "the Court
has dishonored the arts of the historian and degraded the talents of
the lawyer." 60 Howe's rebuke, it appears, had no effect whatso-
ever. The Court went on as before. If it did not actually continue
to recite the same bad history, then it cited earlier cases that them-
selves recited that history.3 61 Some, perhaps most, of the justices
357 I have in an earlier article advocated an "institutional separation" construction
of the Establishment Clause. See Smith, supra note 142. Although the article's
interpretation of the "original understanding" has been criticized, see Douglas
Laycock, Orignal Intent and the Constitution Today, in THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 87-112 (James E. Wood,Jr. ed., 1990), I continue to believe
that the "institutional separation" construction is more attractive, on both "originalist"
and "nonoriginalist" grounds, than either the prevailing doctrine or its leading
competitors, including the "no preference," "no endorsement," and "coercion" tests.
However, given the already considerable length of this Article, and under the
temporary influence of my colleague Pierre Schlag's arguments regarding the futility
of normative legal scholarship, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form,
39 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 167 (1990), I refrain from developing any specific prescription here.
588 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
359 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
360 HowE, supra note 34, at 4.
361 A recent study offers an assessment of the Court's use of history that is almost
identical to the one Howe gave a quarter century earlier: "The Court's habit of
RISE AND FALL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
have expressed doubts about the Court's interpretation of religious
freedom.A62 But the Court seems powerless to change its course.
Although a reorientation of constitutional discourse remains
possible, therefore, one can hardly feel very hopeful about the
prospect. Even so, there is another optimistic observation-one
implicit in the last three words of the title of this Article. Our
current constitutional discourse cannot adequately justify religious
freedom, perhaps, and the constitutional protection of religious
freedom is accordingly in a process of deterioration. It does not
follow, however, that religious freedom itself is doomed. Religious
freedom may still receive indirect constitutional protection under
other headings, such as speech, association, and equality.3 63  In
addition, despite the deterioration of the constitutional commitment
to religious freedom, religion remains eligible for protection by
selectively and sporadically invoking historical arguments to bolster its interpretation
of the religion clauses has distorted the historical data and diluted the Court's
arguments." Witte, supra note 33, at 506.
362 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,636-40
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985)
(Rehnquist,j., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-94 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (proposing "no endorsement" test as a "clarification" of existing
doctrine); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767-69 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring). EvenJustice Brennan, in recent years perhaps the strongest defender
and most aggressive enforcer of the prevailing standard (as set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)), hinted that this test did not represent his
doctrinal preference. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), while employing the
Lemon test, Justice Brennan suggested in a footnote that he was still attracted to a
different test that he had proposed two decades earlier. See id. at 704 n.9 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined injustice Brennan's
Lynch opinion.
" Proposals to collapse the commitment to religious freedom into other values
such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection have
proliferated. See, e.g., David K. DeWolf, State Action Under the Religion Clauses: Neutral
in Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 253 (1990) (advocating Philip
Kurland's version of neutrality, which understands the religion clauses to be a kind
of equal protection provision); Lupu, supra note 211 (arguing that institutional free
exercise rights should be viewed as merely an application of freedom of association);
Lupu, supra note 140 (proposing that religious freedom be understood in terms of
equal protection); Marshall, supra note 10 (advocating that free exercise law be
collapsed into free speech doctrine); Paulsen, supra note 245 (similar proposal);
Tushnet, supra note 351 (advocating Philip Kurland's version of neutrality); PaulJ.
Weber, Neutrality and the First Amendment, in EQUAL SEPARATION, supra note 14, at 1-
13 (similar proposal). This development supports the general argument of this
Article: as the commitment to religious liberty becomes increasingly difficult to
justify in contemporary discourse, scholars naturally seek to defend the commitment
on the basis of what they regard as more comprehensible constitutional values.
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other institutions-in particular, by the institutions of democratic
politics. The Court said as much in Smith. 6 4
This situation need not evoke despair. There is a long-standing
tradition, The Federalist No. 10 being the authoritative expression, of
locating the principal barrier against overreaching government in
the dynamic, conflictual course of pluralist politics. This analysis
can readily be applied, and has been applied, to the issue of
religious freedom: the diversity of religious faiths makes it unlikely
that political institutions will attempt a wholesale restriction of
religious freedom, even if the restraints imposed by courts are
removed. 6 5 Indeed, in view of the clumsiness of the courts'
efforts in this area, a judicial withdrawal from the field conceivably
might leave religious freedom in healthier condition.
Nonetheless, the decline in the constitutional commitment to
religious freedom will have consequences, both practical and
symbolic, which those who regard religious freedom as a fundamen-
tal value must regard as unfortunate. The constitutional protection
of speech, association, and equality does not extend to embrace all
that is afforded by rights to religious freedom. And even if pluralist
politics provides adequate protection for most faiths, peripheral or
unpopular religious groups are unlikely to find much help,366 as
our history in this regard amply demonstrates.
3 67
The symbolic consequence will be the loss of our historic
commitment to religious freedom as a centerpiece of our constitu-
tional order. The subordination of that commitment to other
principles such as freedom of speech or equal protection and, more
generally, to majoritarian politics, represents a kind of constitution-
al transvaluation of values. To those who accept Jefferson's
statement that "the constitutional freedom of religion" is the "most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights," 68 the reordering of
our constitutional discourse is a troubling transformation.
34 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
365 For a forceful argument that religious liberty has always depended primarily
on politics and religious pluralism, not on any constitutional philosophy of religious
freedom, see generally Bradley, supra note 55.
366 See Laycock, supra note 339, at 1014-16.
367 See supra note 241.
36 See Jefferson, supra note 11, at 958.
